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EFFICIENCY AS A STANDARD FOR EVALUATING
LEGAL RULES
RUSSELL PANNIERt

The applicationof economic principlesto analyze andsolve legalproblems
has become one of the most quickly expanding areas of legal thought. An
often overlooked aspect of this discussion is the wisdom of using the criterion of economic efficiency to resolve legal issues. ProfessorPannier questions the judiciay's ability to make the necessary economic analyses and
argues that judicial use of economic theory raises serious moral issues.
ProfessorPanniercriticallyexamines utilitarianism,Paretoeftienc, and
Kaldor-Hicks eftiency to expose shortcomings in those concepts. Professor Pannierconcludes that economic eftciency is an inappropriatestandard
to evaluate legal rules and chooses a naturallaw theory of the good as a
more principledstandardallowingfor greater humanfreedom.
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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I shall try to state and assess some of the difficulties
that arise from attempts to use certain technical analyses of the
concept of efficiency to evaluate legal rules. I shall argue that the
use of such analyses raises two main issues. First, there is the epistemological problem of making the necessary calculations. In this
regard, I shall argue that the judicial system is inherently inadequate to the task. I shall further argue that the very obviousness of
t Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. A.B., Olivet College; M.A., Harvard University; J.D., University of Minnesota. The author wishes to
thank Professor David Haynes, Professor David Prince, Professor Jeremiah Reedy, Steven
Rau, Irving Colacci, Stephen Setterberg and Steven Tillitt for reading an earlier version
of this article and for making helpful suggestions. The author also wishes to acknowledge
the research assistance of Alan Felix.
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the inadequacy calls for an explanation of the repeated efforts to
develop such analyses. Second, I shall try to show that even if
courts could make the necessary calculations, judicial use of such
analyses would founder upon the more serious defect of presupposing what I shall call a nonevaluative theory of the good. I shall
argue that nonevaluative analyses are inherently inadequate to the
task of evaluating legal rules.
The concept of a resource is central to my analysis and will be
used in the following sense. A human action is a use of human
time. A use of human time has an internal and external dimension. The internal dimension comprises the complex of purposes,
conscious and unconscious, which the agent is pursuing. The external dimension consists of all the action's causal consequences. A
resource is anything that is usable in the process of human action.
The primary resource is human time. All other resources are secondary resources.
I shall assume that existence within a moral framework is an
essential part of what it is to be human. I define moral framework
as the mixture of moral impulses influencing particular persons at
particular times. The moral framework of an individual, considered at a particular time, consists of the total complex of purposes,
conscious and unconscious, which he is pursuing at that time.
Thus, I define moral framework in terms of the internal dimension
of an act; A's moral framework is constituted by the internal dimension of his present use of time. It follows that for any particular use of human time there exists an associated moral framework.
I am not suggesting that the converse is not necessarily true; that
is, I am not suggesting that an individual's moral framework is
necessarily constant over time. I also do not intend to suggest that
the complex of objectives making up a moral framework is necessarily internally consistent.
I shall distinguish first-order from second-order efficiency norms.
A first-order efit'ency norm recommends a particular course of action
as an efficient means of pursuing a particular objective. The norm
recommends only the means, not the objective itself. For this reason I shall call such norms value-nonspeciftc efficiency norms. A wellfounded first-order efficiency norm is one whose recommended
means is efficient. First-ordereffiiency is action in accordance with
well-founded first-order efficiency norms.
A second-order effwiency norm characterizes general conditions
under which one ought to pursue first-order efficiency. I shall dishttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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tinguish two kinds of second-order norms. On the one hand, one
might recommend first-order efficiency to another with respect to
all objectives the latter might choose to pursue. Because of the
neutrality of such norms with respect to the actual objectives persons choose to pursue I classify them as value-nonspecific norms.
On the other hand, one might recommend first-order efficiency
with respect to certain objectives as opposed to others in any situation in which conflict between purposes requires that first-order
efficiency be sacrificed somewhere. I shall call such efficiency
norms value-specic.
II.

FIRST-ORDER EFFICIENCY NORMS

In this section I shall outline the concept of a first-order efficiency norm and characterize the sense in which such norms are
morally neutral.
Suppose that A is apparently engaged in the project of building
a house. He is working with a large stack of lumber, a barrel of
nails, and several handsaws and hammers. The puzzling aspect of
his behavior is that he is trying to cut the boards with the claw of
one of the hammers and trying to drive nails with the edge of one
of the saw blades. Naturally, he is not making much progress. He
is badly mangling the ends of the boards which he does manage to
cut, has broken several of the hammers, has twisted out of shape
some of the saws, and has ruined two out of every three nails he
has tried to drive.
Now suppose that B watches A for a time and then tells A that
he is proceeding in a very inefficient manner. In particular, B
makes the following statements. He claims that A's methods will
result in a substantial waste of A's time and the building materials
and tools. He states that even if A should somehow manage to
complete the house, it will probably not be as well constructed as it
could be if A used proper building methods. And finally, B warns
A that he might not succeed in completing the house at all, given
his exceedingly inefficient methods.
Consider the implications of this example. First, note that the
question of efficiency has arisen with respect to a mode of action,
the apparent construction of a house. The suggested generalization is that the primary subject matter of first-order efficiency concerns is human action. That is, it is primarily ways of doing things
that are efficient or inefficient. Statements attributing efficiency
or inefficiency to things other than modes of action can be transPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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lated into equivalent assertions about modes of action. For example, a statement attributing inefficiency to a particular machine
can be rendered in equivalent terms by a statement attributing
inefficiency to the human modes of activity which use the
machine. And this is only what we should expect, given the fact
that we concern ourselves with tools in order to achieve our
purposes.
Because efficiency concerns relate primarily to actions, it is necessary to consider the purposes defining actions. For an action is a
use of human time directed toward an end.
B's criticisms are directed to the means A has chosen to achieve
his apparent objective, that of building a house. This suggests a
second generalization. First-order efficiency considerations concern the selection of means for pursuing a given objective. A statement raising an efficiency concern is ambiguous to the extent that
an objective in terms of which alternative means can be said to be
efficient or inefficient is left unspecified. The relevant question is
never simply whether a mode of action is efficient; it is rather
whether a given mode of action is efficient with respect to the pursuit of a particular objective.
What concept of efficiency is presupposed by B's three remarks?
The heart of B's criticism is that A is wasting resources, both the
primary resource of his own time and the secondary resources of
building materials and tools.
What is a claim of waste? As expressed in B's first assertion it is
the claim that A could accomplish the same objective with methods that consume fewer resources. That is, B is claiming that A
could build the house with less labor time and fewer tools and
building materials.
This concept of waste can be made more precise. Let 0 be any
particular objective. Let MI, M 2, M 3, . . . M. be the possible
ways of achieving 0. A claim of inefficiency of the kind expressed
in B's first statement consists of the claim that one of these alternative means, say Mi, is less efficient than one or more of the others
in the attainment of 0. That is, a claim that M 1 is inefficient is
the claim that one or more of the other enumerated means can be
used to accomplish 0 with less consumption of resources.
Now consider B's second assertion. B warns A that unless A proceeds in a more efficient manner he risks building a house of considerably poorer quality than would result from a use of standard
building methods. In what sense is this a claim of waste?
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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It does not seem to be a claim that one of the available methods
for achieving a given objective is less efficient than one or more
alternative methods. It seems rather to be a claim that the objective itself may be only partially attained. Notwithstanding the superficial difference, the latter claim is also a claim of inefficiency.
This can be seen by considering the implications of the statement
that a particular process is wasteful in the sense that there is an
alternative means for achieving the given objective with less consumption of resources. Suppose that to be the case in a given instance. It follows that with more efficient means, resources will be
freed for use either in promoting more fully the given objective or
for promoting some other desired end. If the given objective is one
that is capable of accomplishment in varying degrees (such as
building a house or producing to meet the economic needs of a
society) and if a more complete accomplishment is believed preferable to a lesser degree of success, then the freed resources will be
used to more fully promote the given objective. Thus, the mode of
inefficiency asserted in B's first statement entails the mode asserted
in the second. Both are claims of wasted resources.
A similar point can be made with respect to B's warning that A
may not even aecomplish his objective. Again, suppose that a certain process is inefficient in the first sense. With the more efficient
means, resources will be freed for use either in achieving the given
objective or for promoting some other end. Assuming that the actor prefers to attain the given objective with his present resources,
the freed resources will be used to achieve that end. Again, the
concept of waste presupposed by B's first statement entails that
presupposed by the third.
These considerations can be summarized as follows: A claim of
first-order inefficiency relates to a specific objective in whose terms
alternative means can be said to be either efficient or inefficient.
Given a particular objective, 0, a claim of first-order inefficiency is
the claim that one of the alternative means, M,,

M,

M3

.

..

,

M,

of achieving 0 consumes more resources than at least one of the
alternatives. Such a claim of waste can be expressed in at least
three ways: in the assertion that 0 could be achieved with less
consumption of resources, in the assertion that with the more efficient means 0 could be more fully realized, and in the warning
that 0 may not be achieved at all.
The significance of the fact that an efficiency claim is conceptually tied to a particular objective can be seen more fully by considering the following examples. Suppose that A responds to B's
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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criticisms by stating that he is not trying to build a house at all but
is rather publicly protesting the employment practices of his employer. A maintains that the purpose of his activities on the job
site is to bring about a public confrontation with the employer.
This response renders irrelevant B's claim of inefficiency. Given
A's objective there may be no inefficiency at all; there may be no
alternative means that consumes fewer resources than A is using
with respect to the objective of forcing a confrontation with the
employer.
Thus, a claim of inefficiency is logically tied to the claim that
there are alternative means for achieving a given objective. If the
objective changes the question of efficiency necessarily changes. A
mode of action may be an inefficient means of achieving objective
01 but an efficient means of achieving objective 02. A claim of
inefficiency or efficiency is ambiguous unless a particular objective
is specified in whose terms the question of waste can be addressed.
It follows that when an agent engaged in a course of conduct is
confronted by an efficiency critic, a necessary condition for the
agent's conceding the relevancy of the critic's charge is the concession that he is pursuing the objective to which the critic's objection
is tied.
The question arises whether agreement concerning an objective
common to both the agent's conduct and the critic's charge is not
only a necessary condition for joinder on the issue of efficiency, but
a sufficient condition as well. The following example suggests a
negative answer. Suppose that A is using conventional building
methods. He is sawing the boards with a handsaw and driving
nails with a hammer. The only criticism in the name of efficiency
B can offer is that A is using a handsaw instead of a power saw. B
claims that A could build the house more efficiently with a power
saw, that using a handsaw consumes more labor time and more
energy per unit of labor time and that a power saw makes more
accurate cuts. A agrees that one of his objectives is to build a
house, but claims that he promised the owner of the lot that he
would avoid using power tools out of consideration for the owner's
elderly mother residing next door. Suppose that A also says that
his promise to avoid power tools is more important than building
the house as efficiently as possible (where efficiency is measured
against the objective of building a house only). A concludes that,
given both objectives, and given his ranking of one over the other,
his methods are efficient.
These points may be generalized. Let 01, 02, 03, . . . ,0 be
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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the objectives an agent A is pursuing with a given course of conduct. Some of these objectives may conflict in the sense that it will
not be possible to accomplish each in as great a degree as would be
possible, and perhaps desirable, if each was being pursued separately. In such a circumstance A will be forced to make a preference ranking of the objectives in order to resolve conflicts. Thus,
suppose that A ranks O i above O. Suppose further that a situation arises in which A must choose between achieving O i at the
expense of failing to achieve O as fully as would otherwise be possible, on the one hand, and achieving 0. at some cost to Oi, on the
other. Given his preference ranking, A will try to make sure that
Oi is accomplished even though 0. is slighted to some degree in the
process.
Let B be a critic who claims that A's course of conduct with
respect to objective O k is inefficient. A necessary condition for A's
joining issue with B with respect to the efficiency question is that B
present A with a plan under which A will be able to achieve all his
objectives, 01, 02, 03, ...
, On with less consumption of resources
and without sacrificing any objectives A ranks ahead of Ok.
This analysis applies to any situation in which an agent has
ranked his objectives. In particular, it does not matter whether the
objectives are related in a single means-end sequence or whether
some are mutually independent. To see this, suppose that A is
pursuing objectives 0, and 02. There are at least two possible
cases. In one, A is pursuing 01 as a means of achieving 02. In the
other, A is pursing neither 01 nor 02 as a means of achieving 02.
Consider the first case. Suppose that A has an ideal conception of
02 that he wants to realize. Thus, outcomes that some would
count as achievements of 02 would not satisfy A. A's particular
understanding of 02 will express itself in the way he pursues 0,. A
will pursue O in such a way as to ensure that he will achieve 02 in
accordance with his ideal. If challenged about the methods he is
using to achieve 0, A's response will be that he will listen to alternative suggestions only if the alternatives will both save resources
and enable him to realize 02 in accordance with his specific intention. Thus, for A, 02 operates as a constraint upon the range of
alternative means of achieving 0,
A similar point can be made about the second kind of case.
Suppose that A is engaged in a course of conduct directed toward
objectives 01 and 02, where neither is pursued as a means to the
other. Suppose further that A has ranked 02 above O 1 in the sense
that, although he desires to achieve .0, he wants to avoid doing
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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anything that would impair his chances of achieving 02. Again,
O2 operates as a constraint upon A's pursuit of 0, in the sense that
it rules out certain methods of achieving 0,.
In either case a necessary condition for pursuading A that he is
pursuing 0, inefficiently is presenting an alternative which both
saves resources and does not reduce his chances for achieving his
particular understanding of O 2 .
These considerations suggest a way of distinguishing between
two kinds of first-order efficiency norms. A categorical first-order
efficiency norm has the form, "Means M i is an efficient way of
achieving objective Oi" where Oi is the conjunction of all the
objectives presently pursued by an agent together with his preference ranking. A hypothetical first-order efficiency norm has the
form, "If you want to achieve objective Oi then you ought to use
means Mi" In ordinary circumstances each implies the other.
First-order efficiency norms are value-nonspecific. They are
morally neutral in the sense that one making such a recommendation makes no claim with respect to the desirability of the given
objective O. The claim is simply that a particular means is an
efficent way of achieving O i.
The point made above concerning the ambiguity of efficiency
claims which do not specify particular objectives in whose terms
alternative means can be said to be efficient or inefficient has an
analogue with respect to the concept of cost. The concept of cost is
best understood in terms of opportunity cost. The opportunity
cost of a given course of action is the next best opportunity that
could have been exploited., Clearly, the cost of a given course of
conduct depends upon whatever particular objectives one takes to
be "next best" in a particular situation. Two observers with different preference rankings of alternative objectives will often differ
over the opportunity cost of any given course of conduct. One
would take the next best alternative to be X while the other would
regard Y as the relevant foregone opportunity. This kind of difference is a difference of moral framework. As I have argued, a moral
framework is a function of the totality of objectives an agent is
pursuing at any given time. This totality will include an order of
objectives which the agent will use, either consciously or unconsciously, to ascertain the cost of other opportunities.
1. See, e.g., A.

ALCHIAN

& W.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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III.

SECOND-ORDER EFFICIENCY NORMS

Second-order efficiency norms are recommendations about the
general conditions under which it is desirable to pursue first-order
efficiency. A second-order norm does not recommend any particular means of achieving a particular objective. In order to provide
concrete guidance in any specific case, second-order efficiency
norms must be supplemented with appropriate first-order norms.
Second-order efficiency norms divide into two classes depending
upon whether the norm takes an affirmative position with respect
to the desirability of a particular objective.
Agenerah'zed efficiency norm urges the policy of doing everything
with the greatest possible first-order efficiency. There are no recommendations concerning specific means of pursuing specific
objectives. There is simply the general recommendation that
whatever one chooses to do, one should pursue one's purposes with
maximum first-order efficiency.
What moral justifications are available for the use of generalized
efficiency norms? First, there is the argument that it is always desirable to conserve resources. Resources are scarce in relation to
desires. Inefficiency wastes resources. The second argument appeals to the aesthetic sensibility. Even if inefficiencies did not
waste scarce resources they would still offend one's aesthetic desire
for elegant solutions. A procedure that accomplishes a given objective with less consumption of resources than another is more
elegant, and therefore better, than the other.
There is a sense in which both generalized and first-order efficiency norms are neutral with respect to objectives and for that
reason I classify both as value-nonspecific norms. Neither takes an
affirmative position concerning the desirability of particular objectives. It might seem to follow that such norms are appropriate in
any situation in which there are first-order inefficiencies, but this is
not the case. Suppose an agent is pursuing objectives which a potential efficiency critic regards as evil. Would it be justifiable for
the critic to urge the agent to pursue his purpose with maximum
efficiency? Hence, value-nonspecific efficiency norms are not always morally appropriate. They ought to be applied within the
constraints of moral principles which define the outer limits of permissible objectives. It follows that there is a sense in which not
even value-nonspecific efficiency norms are morally neutral. From
the fact that an efficiency critic makes a first-order or generalized
recommendation, one can infer that he does not regard the agent's
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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hierarchy of objectives as falling outside the class of morally permissible purposes.
In contrast to first-order and generalized efficiency norms, valuespecific efficiency norms commit the critic to a position concerning
the desirability of a given objective (other than the objective of
conserving resources wherever possible, an objective characteristic
of any value-nonspecific norm). I shall distinguish between weak
and strong value-specific norms.
For the purpose of illustrating the concept of a weak value-specific efficiency norm, consider critic C who, observing the activities
of agent A, refuses to give in to A's demand that in making any
efficiency recommendation, C accept as a given A's hierarchy and
ranking of objectives. C refuses to comply with A's demand that
any efficiency recommendations be either of a hypothetical or generalized form. Suppose that C insists that insofar as A's course of
conduct includes the pursuit of a particular objective, Oj, A pursue
0j with all possible first-order efficiency, regardless of the consequences of such a single-minded pursuit for A's other objectives.
For example, suppose that in our earlier case involving a choice
between a handsaw and a power saw C refuses to yield to A's insistence that he intends to comply with the owner's request that no
power tools be used. C argues that if A intends to build a house A
should use the most efficient means possible. What would this attitude imply about the critic's moral presuppositions? Minimally, it
implies that C believes that the objective of building a house ranks
above any of A's other objectives. Additionally, it implies that C
believes that A's preference ranking is inferior to a ranking in
which the objective of building a house is ahead of all of A's other
objectives.
This suggests a way of defining the concept of a weak valuespecific efficiency norm. Such a norm recommends that if a certain objective is pursued at all it ought to be pursued with the
greatest possible first-order efficiency, regardless of the cost to
other objectives. A weak value-specific efficiency recommendation
is necessarily tied to a particular objective (other than the general
objective of conserving resources as such). Hence, one makes a
weak value-specific efficiency recommendation (with respect to objective 0j) if one advocates that whenever a set of objectives is
pursued which includes OP 0. should be pursued as efficiently as
possible. A critic who insists that because A has chosen to build a
house, he ought to use a power saw regardless of any conflicting
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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commitments would be making a weak value-specific efficiency
recommendation.
A strong value-specific efficiency norm is a recommendation that
a particular objective be pursued with all possible first-order efficiency whenever it is possible to pursue it at all, not just whenever
it happens to be pursued. For example, a critic who insists that
everyone use all possible resources to build houses would be making a strong value-specific efficiency recommendation. Similarly, a
hedonist who recommends that one use all available times and
places for the maximally efficient pursuit of private pleasure would
also be making a strong value-specific recommendation.
Because they are second-order norms, both weak and strong
value-specific efficiency norms require supplementation by first-order efficiency recommendations in order to be applied in specific
circumstances. Thus, one who makes a strong value-specific recommendation to another has not yet given any concrete advice
that the latter can follow, even if the latter accepts the critic's second-order norm. In order to make his efficiency analysis concrete
the critic must describe a procedure that he claims is more efficient
in terms of the favored objective.
What are the moral presuppositions grounding the use of valuespecific efficiency norms? It is clear that such norms require a different kind of justification than value-nonspecific norms. Valuenonspecific norms presuppose only a belief in the general desirability of efficiency as such. Value-specific norms presuppose, in addition, a belief that a particular objective, other than the objective of
promoting efficiency as such, is more desirable than competing
objectives. That is, the particular objective in whose terms a certain value-specific norm is defined is ranked ahead of all other
objectives that compete for scarce resources with the favored objective. It follows that justification of a particular value-specific
norm requires justification of a value ordering which ranks the objective to which the norm is conceptually tied ahead of competing
objectives.
It follows that an agent to whom a critic directs a value-specific
recommendation will accept the recommendation only if he agrees
with the critic's valuation of the objective the critic is recommending. If the agent disagrees with the critic's ranking of objectives he will be willing to pursue the critic's favored objective only
to the extent permitted by the objectives the agent prefers to the
critic's objective. In such a situation the agent will use his more
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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important objectives to define the boundaries within which the
critic's objective is permitted to operate. That is, the agent will
admit the desirability of a particular objective only to the extent
that the objective coheres with his own teleological orientation.
The controversial nature of a strong value-specific norm can be
seen by noticing that such a claim really amounts to an assertion
that a particular objective is a component of the intrinsic human
good. What could be intended by a claim that a certain objective
should be pursued at all times with maximum first-order efficiency
other than the proposition that the favored purpose is intrinsically
desirable in all possible situations, that it is part of the intrinsic
good? Weak value-specific norms also presuppose claims about
the intrinsic human good. One advocating a weak value-specific
norm must at least assume that one's favored objective is closely
enough related to the intrinsic human good to warrant maximally
efficient pursuit in all situations in which the purpose is being
pursued.
It follows that the evaluation of a value-specific efficiency norm
must be done on the basis of a general theory of the good. Since a
value-specific efficiency norm constitutes a claim about the nature
of the good, evaluation of the claim must also rely upon a theory of
the good; evaluation of such norms inevitably takes one into the
realm of philosophy. I shall argue that the standards of Pareto
and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are value-specific efficiency norms. I
shall also argue that they are inadequate standards of the good
and consequently are, by themselves, inadequate standards of
evaluation for legal rules.
One of the incidental benefits resulting from making the distinction between first-order and second-order value-specific efficiency
norms is the light that is shed on the noneconomist's vague sense of
discomfort at the economist's continual use of the unqualified term
"efficiency." It is embarrassing to feel compelled from time to
time to choose courses of action that are incompatible with what
economists regard as "efficient." How can one justify opposing
"efficiency" under any circumstances? But when one realizes that
economists are generally using second-order value-specific efficiency norms supplemented by first-order effiency directives most
of this discomfort should evaporate. Opposing the dictates of "efficiency" in a particular context is not at all comparable to opposing
motherhood, the family or the flag. The economist is actually relying upon a particular theory of the intrinsic good in recomhttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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mending what he calls "efficiency" and his theory of the good is
probably just as controversial as yours.
IV.

THE UTILITARIAN CRITERION

The technical explications of the concept of efficiency that have
been developed by economists are closely related to classical utilitarian principles. It is therefore useful to begin an analysis of efficiency by briefly examining these principles. I shall argue that in
spite of the fact that the technical efficiency standards were
designed to avoid perceived deficiencies in the utilitarian criterion
the deficiencies have not been overcome. In particular, the epistemological problems raised by the need to make complex welfare
calculations and the reliance upon a nonevaluative theory of the
good are common to all such standards.
I understand the utilitarian standard to be the normative principle that, given a set of alternative courses of action, one ought to
select that alternative which will maximize the total net sum of
happiness of all persons whose welfare will be causally affected by
2
the decision.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the principle of utility
should be used in adjudicative contexts, the question arises as to
how it should be used. There seem to be at least three alternatives.
First, one might suggest that courts should apply the criterion on a
case-by-case basis. That is, courts should resolve the concrete disputes brought before them by applying the utilitarian standard
directly to each conflict of interest; courts should not resolve cases
by applying general rules. The judicial task should be one of ascertaining which outcome in any specific case would probably result in the greatest possible aggregate satisfaction of all individuals
affected by the decision. Second, one might suggest that courts use
the utilitarian test in choosing between alternative interpretations
of a rule in situations in which the rule can be plausibly interpreted in more than one way. That is, although courts should resolve cases by applying general rules they ought to use the
utilitarian standard in selecting the most justifiable interpretations
of the rules. Third, one might contend that courts should use the
principle of utility whenever they have an opportunity to create
rules. A court should list all possible rules that could be used to
resolve the question, determine the net aggregate welfare conse2. See, e.g., J.

SMART

& B. WILLIAMS,

UTILITARIANISM

4 (1973); see also C.

DYKE,

PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMIcS 30 (1981).
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quences for the affected class of persons flowing from a general
application of each rule and select that rule whose consistent application would yield the greatest net sum of welfare. I shall not
deal with the question which alternative is the most plausible. I
will argue that they are all subject to the same kinds of difficulties.
Critics of utilitarianism have often pointed to the alleged diffi3
culty or impossibility of making the required welfare calculations.
It is often charged that there is no coherent way in which the necessary interpersonal comparisons of welfare can be made, either on
a cardinal or ordinal basis. But what is not often noticed is that
one cannot intelligently deal with welfare measurement without
first addressing the problem of characterizing the nature of welfare
interests themselves. One cannot measure something without first
understanding what it is one is to measure.
The concept of human welfare presupposes two more basic concepts, that of human desire and that of desire fulfillment and frustration. Having desires, conscious and unconscious, is an essential
part of being human. Action is undertaken in pursuit of intentions
which are grounded in desires. Any given desire is related to a
course of action in one of two ways: either the desire is fulfilled, at
least in part, by the course of action or it is frustrated to some
degree. Well-being is the state of consciousness accompanying the
fulfillment of a desire. Suffering is the state resulting from the
frustration of a desire. The ultimate touchstone for the presence of
well-being or suffering is immediate experience. There could be
no test other than direct experience itself for determining whether
one is experiencing well-being or suffering. It is true that often
well-being or suffering is experienced on unconscious levels and
that sustained self-consciousness may be necessary to become
aware of their presence. But once their presence invades the realm
of conscious awareness the only available criterion for their presence is immediate intuition.
There are at least three causes of frustration of desire. First,
there is the case in which a desire is unfulfilled because of the state
of the world external to the agent. The agent strives to fulfill a
desire, but because of factors outside himself the desire is frustrated. For example, A desires to become a mechanical engineer.
One week before entering engineering school war is declared by
A's nation. A is conscripted into the army and killed in action.
3. S&e, e.g., C. DYKE, supra note 2, at 30-34; E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIcs 443
(3d ed. 1979).
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Suffering caused in this way can be alleviated only by a change in
the state of the world. Second, there is the situation in which the
agent encounters frustration because of a personal inability or lack
of power. For example, A desires to become a mechanical engineer. A takes the entrance examinations and although he tries to
the best of his ability, he fails to score high enough to qualify for
admission. Suffering caused in this way can be extinguished only
by the agent's acquiring the missing power. A third case is that in
which a desire is frustrated because of the presence of another desire which conflicts with the first desire. The first desire can be
fulfilled only at the expense of the second desire, and vice versa.
To the extent that the second desire is fulfilled the first is frustrated and suffering results. Suffering caused in this case can be
eliminated only by the agent's abandoning or modifying one of the
two conflicting desires.
Human well-being is a function of the relative presence or absence of all three categories of causal factors. Perfect well-being
would be a state of consciousness in which no desire was frustrated
by the state of the external world, no desire remained unfulfilled
because of a lack of a power on the part of the individual and
there were no mutually conflicting desires. This last condition is
captured by the concept of integration. Integration is a state of
the self in which there are no conflicting desires.
Presumably, the utilitarian standard presupposes such a concept
of well-being. The recommendation of the principle of utility is
that choices be made with the purpose of bringing about a state of
affairs in which personal integration, coincidence of desire and
power, and a matching of desire with the external world is maximized for the relevant group of individuals.
How is one to go about measuring welfare in this sense? The
problem is one of fashioning a method for determining, for any
one of a set of alternative choices, the consequences for the welfare
of all persons whose lives are likely to be affected by the choice and
for selecting the alternative whose welfare consequences are superior to any of the others.
This task, in turn, can be broken down into three components.
First, one must be able to ascertain the causal consequences of an
action for the range of choices available to other persons. Consider
an action and a particular person whose well-being will be affected
in some way by the act. Then one can classify the possible consequences of the act as follows. Some consequences may consist of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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precluding certain options for the individual. Others will make
available options unavailable. Some consequences may render
certain options more or less difficult than they would otherwise be.
After ascertaining the causal consequences of an alternative in
the foregoing sense one must be able to evaluate those consequences for an individual's life in terms of his welfare. That is,
after ascertaining that a particular course of action would have
certain consequences for the range of options available to another,
one must be able to determine what effect those consequences will
have for one's state of consciousness. In addition, one must have
some method for ranking an entire set of alternative choices according to the degree to which each would promote the happiness
or suffering of any particular individual.
These component tasks can be illustrated by imagining oneself
legislating, in accordance with the utilitarian standard, for a single
person. Given a legislative choice between members of a set of
alternative rules one would have to be able to determine the probable consequences of each alternative for the subject's range of options, and would then have to be able to evaluate each set of
consequences in terms of one's happiness and rank them according
to their comparative degrees of production of welfare.
Finally, one needs a method of making interpersonal comparisons of welfare. Interpersonal comparisons are called for by the
utilitarian standard because social choices usually require one to
determine whether a benefit accruing to one person more than offsets a detriment incurred by another.
For example, imagine legislating for a society of two persons,
where the legislative choice is between rules 1 and 2. Rule 1
would, if enacted, benefit the first citizen and harm the second,
while rule 2 would benefit the second at the expense of the first.
Unless a comparison of the true accrued benefit or harm to each
individual can be made, no utilitarian standard can be applied.
I shall not discuss the problems involved in ascertaining the
causal consequences for the range of options available to those
whose lives will be affected by a choice. Whatever inherent difficulties there may be in making such predictions they are not
unique to the utilitarian principle. Any principle of social choice
which deems relevant the consideration of causal consequences of
actions is forced to respond to the skeptic's challenge that one is
never sufficiently certain of causal consequences to warrant basing
social decisions upon such predictions. And, in any case, a princihttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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pie of social choice that refuses to consider probable causal consequences of alternative choices is simply irrational. Estimating
causal consequences is often difficult and uncertain, but there is no
reasonable way of avoiding it.
The second component task presents the problem of measuring
welfare in the individual case. How should one go about measuring individual welfare? There seem to be at least three possibilities. First, one might ask the individual whose welfare will be
affected by the decision which of the alternative choices would, in
his judgment, result in the greatest satisfaction for him personally.
Second, one might ask him the same question at some time in the
future, after the prospective decision is made and the individual
has had time to determine how his welfare has been affected. Finally, one might try to make the welfare assessment oneself, basing
one's determination upon one's own theory of the good.
Consider the first method. Here, one asks the person whose welfare will be affected by the decision to imagine what desires he
would pursue if he were given unlimited resources and liberty. If
he is able to select one overriding desire, one asks him to repeat the
thought experiment with the assumption that his first choice is unavailable. By means of a series of such thought experiments, the
subject will construct a hierarchy of desires in order of descending
subjective importance. One would then ask him to rank the alternatives available to the decisionmaker in terms of their likely
causal effects upon the desires in that hierarchy. Presumably, this
will enable him to rank the alternative choices according to his
own preferences. I shall refer to this method of determining welfare as a nonevaluative or subjective method because it is tied exclusively to the subjective evaluations of the good of the individual
himself and does not require the person applying the method to
evaluate the moral worth of the other's conception of the good.
In the case of legislating for one person this method would make
the utilitarian standard operational. One would not need a cardinal measure of utility. Asking the person whose welfare will be
affected to rank the alternatives constitutes by itself an ordinal
ranking of those alternatives. Selecting the alternative which the
person prefers achieves the maximization of welfare, as measured
by a nonevaluative criterion.
One of the weaknesses of a nonevaluative criterion is that the
individual, A, whose welfare is at stake may not always be the best
judge of his own interests. When this is so a nonevaluative critePublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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rion will lead to counter-intuitive results. For example, suppose
that one of the legislative alternatives is the legalization of heroin
and suppose that A has a strong propensity for addiction. A might
prefer the legalization alternative but that might not be in his own
best interests. Such examples tend to show that a nonevaluative
criterion cannot be the sole touchstone for social choice. If used at
all it must be supplemented by another standard of welfare.
In order to correct this deficiency one might look to the second
welfare measure mentioned above, viz., that of ascertaining the
preference ranking of the individual whose welfare is at stake after
he has had time to verify for himself the welfare consequences of
the social choice that was made. Such a ranking might be different from the ranking the subject would have proposed at the time
the choice was being contemplated and may be more consistent
with his best interests. This measure obviously cannot assist in
making the social choice itself, for it works, if at all, only after a
decision has been made and after the subject has verified for himself the welfare consequences.
The third welfare measure looks to the decisionmaker's theory of
the good rather than to the subject's theory. This measure will not
lead to the kinds of counter-intuitive results the first method generates, at least when the decisionmaker is better able than the subject to ascertain the subject's best interests. But does not this
observation constitute a decisive objection to the third measure? Is
it not intolerable arrogance for the decisionmaker to presume that
he knows A's best interests better than A himself?
This appearance of unfairness can be lessened by making certain assumptions. Suppose that the decisionmaker consults A
prior to making his decision in order to discover A's preferences.
The decisionmaker is committed to going along with A's preferences unless he is justifiably convinced that A's preferences in a
particular context are not in A's best interests and that more good
than evil will be produced by refusing to accede to A's preferences.
A has participated in the selection of the decisionmaker and has
consented to entrust him with the necessary political power to
make social choices that will affect A's well-being. Both A and the
decisionmaker subscribe to a political philosophy which asserts
that the common good can best be promoted by a division of labor
under which specific persons are assigned the role of systematically
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reflecting upon the conditions of the common good. 4 Finally, suppose that A and the decisionmaker share a common human essence in the form of common fundamental desires, that both
understand this, that the decisionmaker has self-knowledge of at
least some of these basic needs, that he desires to promote them in
A's case and that A understands this. If these conditions are satisfied then the situation proves fairer than a first impression might
suggest. Whether these conditions are satisfiable is a controversial
and important question of political philosophy.
I shall refer to the third measure of welfare as an evaluative or
objective criterion of welfare. It might be objected that this method
is just as "subjective" as the first. Do not both depend on the subjective preferences of individuals? Although this is true there is a
sense in which the third method is objective and the first is not.
The third method assumes the existence of an intrinsic human
good common to all persons. That is, it assumes that certain
modes of being and certain resources are necessary for human
well-being. The first method assumes that the good varies from
individual to individual and that there exist no common measures
for it that are intersubjectively valid.
The choice between a social-choice standard based upon a
nonevaluative theory of the good and one based upon an evaluative theory becomes even more significant when the absence of alternatives is recognized. That is, if a society decides that coercive
adjudicative power must be placed in the hands of certain individuals, then such power must necessarily be exercised on the basis of
one of the two theories. The choice is not between giving courts
coercive power to effect their personal theories of the good and
refusing to give them coercive power at all. The choice is rather
between two uses of coercive power. In the one case courts will
exercise coercive power on the basis of an evaluative theory of the
good. In the other they will exercise the same coercive power but
on the basis of a nonevaluative theory. The interesting question is:
Upon the basis of which conception of the good is this kind of
coercive political power best exercised?
The contrast between the subjective and objective methods of
measuring welfare can be made clearer by considering the third
component task, viz., that of making interpersonal comparisons of
welfare.
4. For a profound analysis of this concept, see Y. SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF
AUTHORITY

(1980).
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Before attempting to make the distinction in the interpersonal
context it may be helpful to briefly review the distinction between
cardinal and ordinal measures of welfare. A cardinal measure of
welfare for a specific individual would be defined by the specification of a set of criteria or procedures for answering the question,
"How much (in terms of units) happiness or unhappiness is this
individual experiencing in any given situation?" Such a set of criteria would include: 1) a quantitative standard unit of happiness
or welfare and 2) a method for locating a zero point in order that
negative levels of welfare could be counted. A cardinal measure of
welfare applicable in the interpersonal context would be defined
by the specification of a common unit and zero point applicable to
all persons. 5 The question whether such a measure is feasible is
irrelevant for my purposes because I do not believe the utilitarian
program needs a cardinal measure. The utilitarian standard can
be applied by means of an ordinal measure of welfare.
In outline, this method would work as follows. For any given
social choice the decision-maker would first list all the alternative
choices. For each one, he would determine the set of causal consequences together with the set of associated welfare consequences.
He would then survey the total set of sets of welfare consequences
and rank them in terms of desirability. Finally, he would select
the alternative whose welfare consequences outranked the others. 6
That such procedures are possible can be seen by reflecting
upon everyday situations in which we intuitively apply them. Imagine a parent with three children trying to choose between several vacation alternatives. Presumably the parent is generally
familiar with the preferences of his children concerning vacation
activities. One prefers swimming to all other activities, fishing
next, hiking next, etc. The other children have somewhat different
rankings. It seems undeniable that a sensitive parent can make at
least a rough ordering of the alternatives in such a way as to select
that one which will yield the greatest amount of happiness for the
family. Such an ordering can be made without recourse to any
cardinal measure of welfare. It may be theoretically unclear how
we are able to make such orderings but the fact that we can and
do make them seems certain.
It might be thought that the only requisites for an ordinal measure of interpersonal welfare are the following: (i) a method for
5. See J. QUIRK, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs 75 (1976).
6. For a similar argument, see J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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determining, for any two alternative states of consciousness of a
given individual, whether the first state is greater than, less than,
or equal to the second in terms of happiness; and (ii) a method for
determining, for any two given individuals, A and B, whether a
given state of A's consciousness is greater than, less than, or equal
to a given state of B's consciousness in terms of happiness. That is,
it might be thought that these two conditions are sufficient for constructing an ordinal measure of interpersonal welfare and that the
insistence upon a method for linear ordering of total welfare complexes is unjustified. These conditions alone will not suffice. To
see this, imagine a society of two members, A and B. Suppose that
the social choice is between State 1 in which A would be happier
than B, and State 2 in which B would be happier than A. Suppose
also that we somehow have the following information concerning
the relative cardinal measures of welfare for A and B under both
alternative states:
State 2
State 1
A' = +25
B1 = -10

A 2 = -12

+15

+18

B2

=+30

Now we know that given the assumed information concerning
cardinal utilities the Principle of Utility would select State 2
because that alternative yields the greatest net sum of welfare. But
if we had only the ordinal information mentioned above we would
know only the linear order of relative welfare states: B2 > A' > B1
> A2. But this information does not suffice for recognizing that
State 2 ought to be selected. We would need, in addition, a
method for ordinally ranking the total welfare consequences of
each member of the set of alternatives. This is just what I have
argued.
Does our intuitive ability to make such interpersonal
comparisons of overall welfare consequences mean that there are
no insurmountable difficulties inherent in the utilitarian program
for adjudication? The answer depends in part upon whether the
utilitarian standard is applied with an evaluative or nonevaluauive
theory of the good.
Imagine what a conscientious court would have to do in order to
apply the utilitarian standard with a nonevaluative theory of the
good. It would first have to determine the identity of the class of
persons whose welfare would likely be affected by whatever
decision is made. The identity of this class will depend, in part,
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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upon which of the three alternative ways of using the utilitarian
standard in adjudicative contexts is chosen. The class of
individuals affected by the adoption of one legal rule rather than
another, or by the selection of one interpretation of a rule rather
than another, will tend to be much larger than the class of persons
whose welfare will be affected by a particular judgment. But
whichever alternative is selected, certain assumptions about the
likely causal consequences of each of the alternative resolutions of
the legal issue will have to be made. Unless the court can do this,
it will not be able to identify the class of persons whose welfare is
at stake. I have already argued that this kind of causal reasoning
is an inherent part of any adjudicative method that looks to the
probable consequences for human welfare of judicial decisions.
Difficulties inherent in ascertaining such causal consequences or in
identifying the class of persons whose welfare is at stake are not
peculiar to the utilitarian program. In particular, such difficulties
are not unique to the program of using the utilitarian standard
with a nonevaluative theory of the good.
The court's second task is more difficult. The court would have
to ascertain the subjective preference rankings, as of the time of
adjudication, of each member of the class likely to be affected by
its decision. Until this is done the court will not be able to make a
linear ordering of the total welfare consequences of each
alternative. It is doubtful that courts are capable of this, at least in
the vast majority of cases. It is one thing for a sensitive parent to
make linear welfare orderings based upon his intimate knowledge
of his children's preferences. It is quite another for a court to do
the same with respect to a large class of persons who are, for all
practical purposes, strangers to the court.
As an illustration, consider some of the ways in which such
determinations of the subjective value preferences might be made.
The ideal presumably would be to provide psychoanalytic sessions
for each member of the class. There are several reasons for
preferring this method to a simple interview or questionnaire
technique calling for the individual to rank in order of personal
preference the alternative legal resolutions of the issue. One would
be more assured of avoiding failures of linguistic communication,
both with respect to the questions asked and the responses of the
subject. One would be better able to elicit the true preferences of
the subject by seeing whether there was any discrepancy between
what the subject says he wanted and what he really wants. This
would facilitate a determination of the relative intensities of the
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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subject's preferences. Obviously, this method is not feasible. Aside
from the barriers of time and expense there would be serious
procedural, jurisdictional and constitutional problems.
A poor second best would be to provide for single interviews
with each class member. The interviewer would present the
subject with a list of the alternative resolutions of the lawsuit and
ask him to order them on the basis of his own preferences. The
interviewer would also try to elicit from the subject judgments
about the relative intensities of his preferences because the court
will ultimately have to make a total welfare ordering on the basis
of these interviews. This method would be subject to the same
difficulties as the first and have none of its quantitative
advantages. The same can be said for a third alternative-that of
simply mailing out questionnaires.
If the court does not try one of the foregoing methods, it
relegates itself to speculating blindly about individual preference
rankings and their relative intensities. This entails abandoning
any pretense of applying the utilitarian standard with a
nonevaluative theory of the good. Consequently, unless some
method is available for eliciting the actual preferences and their
intensities from those whose welfare will be affected by the
adjudication, an evaluative criterion is being utilized.
In contrast, a court applying the utilitarian standard with an
evaluative theory of the good would be in a stronger
methodological position. Like a court applying a nonevaluative
theory, it would first try to ascertain the identity of the class of
persons whose welfare would be affected by the decision. Once
this class is identified, however, the court would place its ultimate
reliance upon its own theory of the good. That is, it would seek
that resolution which, in its own best judgment, would lead to the
greatest amount of human welfare, where the standard of welfare
is internal to the court rather than to the members of the affected
class. Of course, a conscientious court will deem relevant whatever
it can discover about the subjective preferences of the class
members, but it will not regard those preferences as controlling. It
will make the final decision on the basis of its own conception of
the intrinsic good and the best means, under the particular
circumstances, of maximizing that good. The court can
accomplish this task by regarding itself as a mirror or microcosm
of the legitimate needs of the larger society. This would require
the court to imaginatively place itself in the various situations
occupied by persons likely to be affected by its decision and to
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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determine the ways that alternative resolutions of the legal issue
would affect their best interests.
To summarize the discussion thus far, I have distinguished the
use of the utilitarian standard with a nonevaluative theory of the
good from its use with an evaluative theory. I have pointed to
some of the methodological problems inherent in the
nonevaluative kind of application and have argued that such
difficulties are insurmountable in adjudicative contexts. I will now
argue that even if these methodological problems were solvable,
the nonevaluative use of the utilitarian standard in adjudication is
unjustifiable for substantive reasons.
Certain implications of the nonevaluative use of the utilitarian
principle are morally objectionable. As a simple illustration,
consider a three-member society comprised of A, B, and C. Make
the following assumptions: that A hates B and is indifferent to C's
welfare; that the legislative problem is one of allocating a national
product of $21 among these three; that we have already allocated
all but the last dollar of income, with A receiving $10, B receiving
$5 and C receiving $5; that the last dollar would bring B 10 units
of welfare and C 5 units; and that in virtue of A's hatred for B, A
would incur 100 negative units of suffering at seeing B get the last
dollar. If we take into account the welfare consequences of A's
hatred for B, as we are required to do by the nonevaluative
standard, then the last dollar should go to C, despite B's greater
welfare from that dollar. The basis of one's intuitive protest
against such an implication is directed against the very inclusion
of A's hatred in the welfare calculation. It seems morally
misguided to take into account A's desire for B's suffering. And
yet we must, if we are to be faithful to a nonevaluative standard of
well-being, consider A's pernicious desires. Behind this distaste is
doubt about the truth of the .non-evaluative assumption that
satisfying A's desire for B's suffering will bring genuine fulfillment
to A. This doubt is an example of our more general conviction
that satisfaction of certain kinds of human desire fails to lead to
genuine well-being.
This disbelief in the underlying assumption of the nonevaluative
criterion leads to more specific objections. First, insofar as the
nonevaluative utilitarian purports to promote those conditions
which maximize genuine human fulfillment, he must inevitably
fail whenever confronted with human desires whose satisfaction
will ultimately lead to suffering rather than fulfillment. The
nonevaluative utilitarian is engaged in a self-defeating enterprise.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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Apart from the incompatibility of the nonevaluative criterion of
the good and the utilitarian objective, such a moral standard
misses the fundamental point of the moral quest, that of seeking
the conditions of the truly fulfilling human life. If the purpose of
moral reflection is to ascertain the nature of the intrinsic good and
its necessary or useful conditions, then the nonevaluative criterion
cannot possibly help. The proof is that in situations such as the
one presented above, the criterion recommends maximizing
genuine well-being by fulfilling desire to see others suffer. Our
moral intuition tells us otherwise.
A related consideration is our intuitive rejection of the idea that
it is morally justifiable to cause one person to suffer as a means of
fulfilling another's desire, when the suffering fails to promote the
latter's genuine well-being. The presupposition of this objection is
the belief that the only morally legitimate reason for harming a
person is the promotion of the genuine well-being of another. This
is not to say that such a purpose always justifies harming an
individual. But it is to say that harming a person is morally
justifiable, if at all, only in the case where it is the only way of
promoting another's true well-being.
Note that the utilitarian principle, whether used with an
evaluative or nonevaluative standard of the good, is a valuespecific efficiency norm. It is value-specific with respect to the
objective of maximizing human welfare. In addition, since it
purports to be sufficient for all moral issues it is a strong valuespecific efficiency norm. A strong value-specific norm is only as
justifiable as its value-specific objective. That is, only insofar as
the objective constitutes an adequate theory of the good is the
standard sufficiently comprehensive. Thus, the criticism I have
been making of the nonevaluative use of the principle of utility
can be equivalently rendered as the claim that this kind of strong
value-specific efficiency standard is intrinsically inadequate to the
task of doing justice to our moral intuitions.
In light of the methodological and substantive difficulties
inherent in the nonevaluative use of the utilitarian standard, one
might well ask whether utilitarians should apply their standard
with exclusive reliance upon an evaluative theory of the good. I
believe that utilitarians, in general, would be unwilling to do so.
One of the primary motivations behind utilitarianism is the
development of a scientifically respectable method for evaluating
social norms. Utilitarians would like a method for lifting social
theory from the morass of philosophical uncertainty and
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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controversy inherent in traditional natural law approaches. In
particular, they would like a philosophical principle that would
avoid the need for debating the nature of the objective human
essence and the objective human good. They would like to
substitute this traditional Platonic-Aristotelian concern for the
human essence with a method looking only to the subjective value
preferences of those who will be affected by social choices. If one
does not have to concern oneself with the question, "What is the
truly good way to live?", then one can, so the argument goes, put
social theory upon a scientifically firm foundation. One can be
content with the practical problems of ascertaining the nature of
persons' immediate value preferences and seeking ways to
maximize their satisfaction, whatever they turn out to be. Insofar
as this is an accurate characterization of the primary impulse
behind the utilitarian program, it seems unlikely that utilitarians
would be willing to apply their standard on the basis of an
evaluative theory of the good. For a utilitarian, this would be a
retreat to the kind of natural law philosophizing Bentham was
attempting to avoid.
These reflections lead to the question of whether there is a
significant difference between a utilitarianism based upon an
evaluative theory of the good and the natural law approach. In
order to answer this question, we must look briefly at the structure
7
of natural law theory.
Natural law theory incorporates theories of both the individual
and the common good. With respect to the individual good,
natural law theory is an ethic of perfectionism or self-realization.
It understands the ultimate meaning of human life as the
progressive realization of essential human powers. Realization of
these powers and capacities yields the maximum measure of wellbeing that is attainable in the human condition. The essential
powers are grounded in fundamental desires which can be fulfilled
only through action. Thus, the intrinsically good human life is one
of activity, of manifested power, in which essential capacities are
continually realized. The basic criterion of right for the individual
is to do those things which realize his essential powers. Practical
7. For general accounts of natural law theory, see J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); G. GRISEZ & R. SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY (rev. ed.
1980); D. MAGUIRE, A NEW AMERICAN JUSTICE 53-124 (1980); D. MAGUIRE, THE
MORAL CHOICE (1978); J. MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD (1966); T.
O'CONNELL, PRINCIPLES FOR A CATHOLIC MORALITY 117-98 (1978); H.B. VEATCH,
RATIONAL MAN (1962).
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reason is the power to reflect upon the nature of the intrinsic good
and the best means of promoting it in particular circumstances.
The concept of practical reason is not narrowly prudential; some
of the intrinsic desires are genuinely other-regarding.
Supplementing the theory of the individual good with a theory
of the common good is necessary because the essential human
powers of the individual are fully realized only in a social context
where persons cooperate and share. The common good is not an
entity, but a set of activities and practices. In particular, it is
constituted by a complex of activities and practices which work
together to promote the self-realization and fulfillment of each
participant. The good is "common" because in some sense it
benefits every participant in some way and measure. Any
purportedly adequate theory must take into account at least three
dimensions or levels of the common good. These dimensions can
be delineated by distinguishing between three kinds of
interpersonal relationships available in a social context.
First, there is the situation in which two or more persons are
engaged in their respective activities and each refrains from
affirmatively interfering with the activities of the others. In this
case each person is able to pursue individually his chosen activity
just as efficiently as he is doing in the midst of the others. The
relationship to the concept of the common good arises from the
fact that each individual could, by virtue of his very presence,
affirmatively interfere with the activities of the others and chooses
not to do so. In such a context each participant can desire the
others' fulfillment as an end in itself and not merely as a means to
his own fulfillment. But regarding the fulfillment of the others'
desires as an intrinsically desirable end is not a necessary condition
for the realization of the values that each is pursuing.
The second kind of situation is one in which the goods pursued
by each individual would not be attainable, or at least would not
be attainable to the same extent, without the affirmative
cooperation of the others. The activities of all others constitute
affirmative conditions, either necessary or useful, for the
realization of the good on the part of each participant. Obvious
examples are the individual gains that can accrue through division
of labor and voluntary exchange in markets. Again, although the
participants may have genuinely other-regarding desires such
desires are not necessary conditions for the realization of the goods
each is pursuing.
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Finally, there is the situation in which having genuinely otherregarding desires is a necessary condition for achieving the goods
each participant seeks. This category, in turn, divides into two
subcategories. In the first, A's having a genuinely other-regarding
desire for B's fulfillment is a necessary condition for the realization
of the good A seeks. In the second, it is necessary for the
realization of A's good that A have an other-regarding desire for
B's fulfillment, that B have an other-regarding desire for A's
fulfillment, and that A knows the latter fact. An example of the
first subcategory is anonymous giving. An example of the second
is the mutual self-giving of a deep friendship.
Consequently, in each dimension of the common good various
modes of good (both intrinsic and instrumental) arise through the
interaction of the members of the social order as that interaction is
manifested in their activities and practices. It is important to note
that these distinctions are keyed to the specific kinds of goods that
the participants are seeking. That is, the criterion of individuation
is based upon the specific mode of good at issue. Thus, the second
category is sufficient by itself to describe a social context in which
the participants are seeking only goods that do not depend upon
other-regarding desires. But if they seek goods that do so depend
then one must invoke the third dimension of the common good.
The dimensions are not mutually exclusive, depending upon the
goods pursued by the participants. For example, a market
interaction can be adequately analyzed as an instance of the
second dimension of the common good if the participants are not
pursuing goods which depend upon genuinely other-regarding
desires. If they are pursuing such goods, then the third dimension
of the common good is invoked.
All three dimensions of the common good are rooted in the
human essence, that is, rooted in basic human needs. The first two
dimensions do not require any theory of human nature stronger
than the Hobbesian picture. The third dimension, however,
presupposes a human essence which includes genuinely otherregarding desires. The modes of good made available by the third
dimension are "common" in a very strong sense; the relationship
between the goods sought is not contingent or accidental, but is
necessary. An intrinsic aspect of each participant's fulfillment is
witnessing and contributing to the fulfillment of the others.
A complete natural law theory of the common good would
incorporate at least two elements. First, it would articulate the
nature of the personal goods realizable in common and the nature
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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of the practices that make such goods available. Second, it would
present a theory of the conditions which make such practices
possible. The latter theory would incorporate an account of the
practices which can be promoted by collective coercive action
through the legal system and distinguish them from practices that
are best promoted through nonlegal means. It should not be
inferred from my stress upon evaluative standards that a natural
law theory of the common good is authoritarian or totalitarian in
tendency. Great weight is placed upon the value of uncoerced
choices. But this valuation of human freedom does not blind the
tradition to the necessity and importance of collective action with
respect to the promotion of those elements of the common good
that are best promoted in coercive ways, given the conditions of
the human situation.
For natural law theory the only morally justifiable role for
government is the creation and promotion of those conditions that
are either necessary or useful for the free self-realization of the
essential powers of its citizens. This general principle, however, is
subject to the qualification that only some of the conditions of the
common good can be usefully promoted at the level of the
organized state.
The basic difference between a natural law theory of the
common good and utilitarianism with an evaluative theory of the
good is that natural law theory advocates maximizing equal
conditions for maximum self-realization on the part of concrete
individuals whereas utilitarianism recommends maximizing
aggregate welfare. In a sense, utilitarianism looks to aggregate net
welfare as if it were the subjective experience of one superhuman
individual and as if the moral objective were the maximization of
utility for that single supreme consciousness. The touchstone for
natural law theory is the finite human consciousness as the
intrinsically valuable concern of morality. If we had access to the
consciousness of the supreme individual then perhaps there would
be no difference between evaluative utilitarianism and natural law
theory. One of the consequences of this difference is that natural
law theory tends to impose Kantian-like constraints upon the
consequentialist tendency of the teleological method, whereas
utilitarianism is more likely to give the consequentialist principle
unlimited freedom.
Thus, there is a sense in which natural law theory treats
individuals with a greater measure of equal respect and concern
than does utilitarianism. Under the utilitarian approach,
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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individuals with higher marginal utility curves than others tend to
get relatively favorable treatment. There is no such built-in bias
under the natural law approach. Of course, if an evaluative
utilitarian assumes that all persons have equal marginal utility
curves, then the differences between utilitarianism and the natural
law approach would be fewer. But that is a very strong, and
probably false, assumption. It does not seem to be charitable to
saddle the utilitarian with it by definitional fiat.
In addition to these differences there is a difference in style
which seems to reflect a dissimilarity in basic attitude toward the
human dimension. This difference is obscure, and therefore
difficult to articulate, but important. One might characterize it as
a difference in the metaphysical or spiritual tone of voice used in
describing the purpose of moral reflection and the human essence.
The language used by the utilitarian in framing and applying his
standards suggests images that belittle the human essence. There
is a peculiar quality of coldness and detachment (and perhaps
implicit contempt) between the lines of the prose of a Bentham.,
The utilitarian has "understood" the human condition and
trivialized it in the process. There is something about the very
language of maximization as used in utilitarian discussions that
induces in the reader a vague sense of flatness, of disillusionment, a
feeling that we have been shown to be nothing but onedimensional pleasure maximizers with no metaphysical
complexity, no relationship to the mystery of being, no openness to
the transcendent. I believe that at least part of the reason for this
is that talking about "maximizing" a variable attribute (viz.,
welfare) in quantitative terms suggests that the process and goal of
human existence can be adequately described in mechanical or
physical terms, for it is only physical attributes such as length and
weight that can be measured in the clearest sense. This, in turn,
suggests the image of the human as a machine. This language
encourages us to picture the ultimate evaluation of a human life as
analogous to measuring the temperature of a physical substance or
the resistance in an electrical coil. The language marries
mathematics and Newtonian physics so as to preclude us from
seeing ourselves as beings with depth, mystery and complexity.
The reason that it is important to call attention to what may seem
to be only a matter of literary style is that the very language a
8. See Bentham, An Introduaion to the Prnctples of Morals and Legislation, in J.S. MILL,
Warnock ed. 1962).
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philosopher uses in characterizing the human condition tends to
alter his perception and therefore his understanding of that
condition. If our linguistic imagery is inadequate to call our
attention to certain fundamental dimensions of the human order,
then that language is detrimental to the philosophical objective of
understanding reality. The language of natural law philosophy is
not mathematical or mechanical in tone. It is, in a sense, vaguer,
more poetic, or what some might call "thicker." I do not regard
this as a defect. If the human essence does partake of mystery and
depth, then the philosophical language we use in characterizing
ourselves ought to reflect that depth. Here one is reminded of
Aristotle's remark about the proper mode of philosophizing about
ethics: "Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness
as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for
alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the
crafts." 9 A similar point could be made concerning the Pareto and
Kaldor-Hicks standards, which are examined in sections V and
VI.
V.

PARETO EFFICIENCY

Those attracted by the relativistic program of subjectivistic utilitarianism but skeptical about the feasibility of making interpersonal comparisons of welfare might well adopt the concept of
Pareto efficiency as an evaluative standard. For, while based upon
a nonevaluative standard of the good, the Pareto criterion does not
rely upon interpersonal comparisons. The Pareto standard is defined by the concepts of Pareto-superiority and Pareto-optimality.
Social state A is Pareto-superior to social state B if and only if at
least one person whose well-being will be affected by the choice
prefers A to B, and every other person affected by the choice either
prefers A to B or, at worst, is indifferent. 10 Social state A is Paretooptimal if and only if there is no alternative social state that is
Pareto-superior to A. Alternatively, social state A is Pareto-optimal if and only if it is impossible to move to any state other than A
without making at least one person worse off in his own mind
under the alternative than he would be under A.l"
9. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics i.3.1094bi2-14, in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 935, 936 (R. McKeon ed. 1941).
10. See J. HADAR, ELEMENTARY THEORY OF MICROECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 322 (2d

ed. 1974).
11. Id.
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Two standards of social choice are derivable from the foregoing
concepts. One is the rule that, given a social state A which is not
Pareto-optimal, the legal system should always move toward a
state that is Pareto-superior to A. The second standard is the rule
that, given a Pareto optimal state, the legal system is never justified in moving to an alternative state. These two rules can be combined in a single directive: Always move in the direction of
Pareto-superiority and never move in any other direction.
One of the immediate problems of interpretation is that of determining the appropriate level at which these standards should be
applied. Consider the first standard in this regard. There are at
least three possible ways in which it might be used in adjudicative
contexts.
First, it might be applied on a case-by-case basis. A court would
try to determine whether there is any resolution of the dispute
which the litigants, and all others whose welfare is likely to be affected by the outcome, would prefer to every alternative resolution. The Pareto criterion would not be used to evaluate
alternative rules at all, but would supplant existing rules and be
itself the sole touchstone for adjudication.
The difficulty with this method is that the criterion would
rarely, if ever, be satisfied. The very fact that a conflict of interest
finds its way into the judicial system implies the improbability of
any resolution that is Pareto-superior to all alternative resolutions.
This certainly would be the case for the litigants and it is likely to
be true for all others whose welfare will be affected by the outcome. Consider a lawsuit with a single plaintiff and a single defendant. The court has at least three alternatives: (1) deny the
plaintiff's claim, (2) give the plaintiff only a portion of the relief
sought and (3) give the plaintiff the full relief sought. For the
plaintiff, alternative (3) is Pareto-superior to (2), which, in turn, is
Pareto-superior to (1). For the defendant, alternative (1) is Paretosuperior to (2), which, in turn, is Pareto-superior to (3). Thus,
there is no choice that is Pareto-superior to all others for the litigants; afortiori, there will be no such alternative for the class of all
others whose welfare will be affected by the outcome because each
of them will be sympathetic with one or the other of the litigants.
The first Pareto-criterion could also be used as a standard for
evaluating alternative legal rules or general ways of resolving particular kinds of legal disputes. This method of use can, in turn, be
broken down into two more particular modes.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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One would consist of looking for rules that, when applied on a
case-by-case basis in the future, invariably yield outcomes that
were Pareto-superior to all other possible outcomes. This proposal
is even less feasible than the first. There are no rules that could
satisfy the standard. No matter what rule is formulated for resolving a particular kind of issue, conflicts of interest will inevitably
form around it in practice because the rule's application will be in
one person's interest and opposed to another's.
Another mode of use would require the court to list the alternative rules that could be used to resolve the issue. It would then try
to determine which of the alternative rules would be preferred by
each member of the class of persons whose welfare will likely be
affected by the choice. In order to avoid the problems of the preceding method the court would have to imagine each member of
the affected class asking himself which of the alternative rules he
would prefer prior to becoming involved in any legal dispute to
which the choice of rules would be relevant. But even this standard would never be satisfied. Given differing kinds of economic
and moral interests, differing degrees of understanding of legal issues, and differing political philosophies, there could not be a rule
Pareto-superior to all alternatives for the resolution of any particular kind of issue.
These considerations add up to a major criticsm of the first
Pareto criterion. The criterion is useless because it can never be
satisfied. A minimum condition for an adequate standard of evaluation for legal rules is that the standard be applicable to the
kinds of choices courts must make. The first Pareto criterion does
not satisfy this condition.
A second major difficulty with the first Pareto criterion is that of
ascertaining the preferences of the members of the affected classes.
The criterion is usable only insofar as courts are able to determine
those preferences and implement the criterion. There seems to be
no reasonable substitute for asking the members of the class about
their preferences. Yet interviewing each member would present
insurmountable problems of time and expense. Recourse to the
proposal that courts simply rehearse in imagination the "likely"
preferences of each person concedes defeat. The first Pareto criterion purports to rely upon the actual preferences of affected individuals. If courts have no reliable access to those preferences, the
criterion is being used in name only.
Even if courts had workable methods 'or ascertaining the preferPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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ences of affected classes, there would be great difficulties in formulating the alternatives in ways that the public could understand.
Presumably, the Pareto criterion should be applied on the basis of
informed choices. Yet, eliciting informed judgments from the public with respect to complex choices between alternative rules would
require prior public education.
Another problem is that of selecting the class whose preferences
should be ascertained with respect to any particular choice. In
order to be consistent with the subjectivist spirit of the Pareto criterion it seems that the only proper way to identify this class is by
asking every citizen whether he wants to have his preference ranking registered with the court. For the court to take upon itself the
task of identifying the class of persons whose welfare will likely be
affected by a decision would depart from the Pareto objective of
basing social choices upon the actual preferences of the public.
The question whether a particular individual's welfare will be affected by a social choice is itself a question that can be resolved
consistently with a subjectivist standard of the good only by asking
him whether he thinks his welfare will be affected. If he thinks it
will be affected then it will be affected. Thus, each time a court
attempted to apply the first Pareto criterion it would have to poll
the entire population.
But, as with the nonevaluative use of the utilitarian standard,
the most serious difficulty with the first Pareto criterion is moral.
Not all Pareto-superior alternatives are morally justifiable. As
with subjectivistic utilitarianism the reason for this moral deficiency is that an individual's conscious preferences are sometimes
inconsistent with his true welfare. To the extent that false consciousness is part of the human condition, the first Pareto criterion
will lead to morally unjustifiable choices.
One might object that if the first Pareto criterion were satisfied
in a particular case there would be no possibility of even asking the
question whether the Pareto-superior alternative is morally justifiable. If all whose welfare is likely to be affected by a choice prefer
A to B, or are at worst indifferent, there would be no one to raise a
moral objection. This overlooks the proper role of the adjudicating court. Presumably, the Pareto criterion is not intended to take
into account the preferences of the decisionmaker himself; the
whole point is to avoid the necessity of relying upon the moral
judgments of the decisionmaker. Given this assumption, the preferences of the adjudicating court have not been taken into account. The court itself remains as a source of moral knowledge.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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Like subjectivistic utilitarianism, the first Pareto standard is a
strong value-specific efficiency standard. It advises taking every
opportunity to maximize, with all possible first-order efficiency,
the number of legal rules for which there is unanimous consent
while always excepting the preferences of the adjudicating court
itself. It follows, then, that to the extent the first criterion rests
upon an inadequate theory of the good, it cannot suffice as the sole
moral touchstone for evaluating a legal system. And that it rests
upon an inadequate theory of the good follows from its use of a
nonevaluative theory of the good.
Let us briefly review the second Pareto criterion, which dictates
that, given a Pareto-optimal state, one is never justified in moving
the legal system to an alternative state. This standard is subject to
the same methodological problems as the first Pareto standard.
Courts would have to identify the relevant classes and would have
to ascertain the preferences of their members.
In addition, the standard would always be satisfied. Given any
proposed modification of the law, one could always find at least
one person who would object. As a result there would never be
any justification for modifying the law at all. This consequence
conflicts with our moral intuition that the degree of correlation
between any historical legal system and a morally ideal system is
less than perfect.
The most fundamental defect of the second Pareto standard is
that it would bar the movement to morally preferable states of
affairs. Consider a situation in which it is illegal for a certain racial group to own real property. So long as there are citizens who
regard the continuance of this legal prohibition to be in their own
interests the rule will remain. The existing state of affairs is
Pareto-optimal. This, however, contradicts our moral intuition.
Again, this deficiency is the consequence of the Pareto standard's
reliance upon a nonevaluative standard of the good. The second
Pareto criterion is a strong value-specific efficiency standard which
advocates the maximization of the number of Pareto-optimal legal
rules, and whose use of a nonevaluative theory of the good entails
its inadequacy as a moral standard.
In summary, neither Pareto criterion is a morally adequate standard of social choice. The basic reason for this failure is that both
make the mistake made by subjectivistic utilitarianism, viz., assuming that for purposes of evaluating alternative social choices all
one need know are the conscious preference rankings of the memPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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bers of society. This would be morally adequate only if the conscious preferences of individuals were always consistent with their,
and others', true well-being.

VI.

12

KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY

The concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency was introduced in order
to remedy what some economists believed to be the major weakness of the Pareto standard, viz., its general inapplicability. A test
of efficiency was sought which would assist in making choices
among alternatives each of which burdens some and benefits
others. The Pareto standard is useless in situations requiring a balancing of burdens on some against benefits for others. If there is
no available alternative which does not burden at least one individual, and this is the usual case, then there cannot be any Paretosuperior alternative.
The concept of Kaldor-Hicks superiority is definable as follows:
Suppose there is a social choice situation. Let A be the existing
state of affairs and let B be an available alternative. B is KaldorHicks superior to A if and only if, after a change from A to B, those
who believe themselves to have benefited from the change are willing and able to adequately compensate those who believe themselves to have been harmed by the change, and something is left
over in the way of subjectively perceived benefits. 13 Where there is
more than one available alternative, say B, B 2, B 3, . . . , B,,
which is Kald6r-Hicks superior to the existing state of affairs, A,
the Kaldor-Hicks efficient choice is that alternative, Bi, under
which those who would believe themselves to have benefited by a
change from A to Bi would be left with a greater net balance of
benefits after compensating those who would regard themselves as
having been harmed by a change from A to Bi than under any of
the other Kaldor-Hicks superior alternatives. The concept of adequate compensation is tied to the judgments of those who believe
they would be harmed by a particular choice. That is, it is the
persons who regard themselves as likely to be harmed by an alter12. Perhaps the leading exponent of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in legal contexts is
Richard Posner. See generally R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (2d ed. 1977). For the equivalency between what

Posner calls the criterion of "wealth maximization" and the Kaldor-Hicks test, see Baker,
Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 939, 948 n.31 (1981);
Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 236 (1980).
13. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 528-29
(4th ed. 1977); J. QUIRK, supra note 5, at 241.
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native who determine what would be required for adequate compensation in any particular instance. Despite the fact that the
concept of adequate compensation is central to the standard of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, that standard does not require that compensation be actually paid. The criterion can be satisfied by
purely hypothetical compensation. 14
As with Pareto efficiency, the Kaldor-Hicks standard can be
used as a basis for two different directives: (1) Take every opportunity to move to a Kaldor-Hicks superior state of affairs, and
(2) Never move to a state of affairs which is not Kaldor-Hicks superior to the existing situation. I shall refer to these two directives
as thefirst and second Kaldor-Hicks standards. Again, as with Pareto
efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can be applied by courts either
on a case-by-case basis or on the level of the evaluation of alternative rules.
A court applying the first Kaldor-Hicks standard on a case-bycase basis would proceed as follows: It would list the alternative
ways of resolving the case. It would then ascertain, for each alternative resolution, the class of persons who would regard themselves
as benefiting from that resolution and the class of those who would
regard themselves as harmed. These classes would not necessarily
be restricted to the litigants unless, in a particular case, all other
persons were indifferent to the outcome. It would then determine
the net dollar equivalent, if any, the gainers would be left with in
the way of benefits over and above the sum the losers would insist
upon as adequate compensation. Finally, the court would resolve
the case by selecting that method of resolution which would result
in the largest net dollar gain.
A court applying the first Kaldor-Hicks standard on the level of
rule evaluation would proceed in either of two ways. First, the
court could begin by listing the alternative rules that could be used
to resolve the issue. It would then ascertain, for each alternative,
the class of those who would regard themselves as benefited by the
rule and the class of those who would regard themselves as
harmed. It would then determine the net dollar amount, if any,
that the gainers would be left with in the way of benefits over and
above the sum the losers would insist upon as adequate compensation for the harm of being compelled to live under a rule they
oppose. Finally, the court would select that rule which would re14. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, supra note 13, at 529; Coleman, Eftency, Exchange, and Aucion: Philosophic Aspects of the Eonomic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 239 (1980).
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suit in the greatest net dollar gain. Alternatively, the court could
try to select that rule which, in every future application, would
yield an outcome that was Kaldor-Hicks superior to every other
possible outcome. The obvious difficulty with this suggestion is
that the court would be unable to determine the dollar estimates
for all future gainers and losers in all future lawsuits. Thus, the
only plausible way to apply the Kaldor-Hicks standard on the
level of rule evaluation is to proceed as outlined in the first way.
Whether it would be preferable to apply the Kaldor-Hicks standards on a case-by-case basis or on the level of rule evaluation is an
interesting question, but not one that will be addressed here. The
criticisms offered here apply to either method of application.
Before discussing these criticisms, it is important to notice that
the Kaldor-Hicks standards of efficiency are strong value-specific
standards presupposing a nonevaluative standard of the good.
They are strong value-specific standards advocating the maximization, with all possible first-order efficiency, of the number of social
choices leading to Kaldor-Hicks superior states. Furthermore, the
standards presuppose nonevaluative standards of the good in relying exclusively upon the preferences of the members of the affected
classes, as expressed through willingness to make dollar bids for
particular judicial resolutions.
Neither Kaldor-Hicks standard is usable by a court unless it can
accurately identify the classes of gainers and losers under every
alternative. As is the case with the Pareto standard, the only way
to identify such classes consistently with the subjectivist basis of
the Kaldor-Hicks test is to ask each member of society whether he
would deem himself benefited or harmed by a particular choice. If
an individual reports that he would gain by a particular choice he
can then be asked to state how much he would be willing and able
to pay those who regard themselves as harmed, and by what
amount, if any, his total benefit would exceed the total compensation payments. Those regarding themselves as harmed by a particular choice would be asked to state the sum of money they
would require as adequate compensation for their self-perceived
harm.
This need to poll each member of the society makes the KaldorHicks method unusable in adjudicative contexts. As with the
Pareto standard the problems of time and expense would be insurmountable. By avoiding the task of asking persons if they would
regard their welfare as affected by a particular judicial choice, a
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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court would be substituting its judgment about the welfare of
others for the judgments of those persons themselves, thus forsaking the subjectivistic program of the Kaldor-Hicks method.
Once the relevant classes were identified the court would have
to ascertain, for each judicial alternative, the dollar amounts the
losers would demand as adequate compensation. Again, the only
way of assuring accuracy would be to ask the members of those
classes. The same difficulties would arise as were noted in the
analysis of the Pareto program. The surveying would have to be
done in such a way as to make the judicial alternatives meaningful
to each class member. The Kaldor-Hicks method will yield coherent results only to the extent that informed bids are made by those
affected. Generally, this would require prior educational assistance, resulting in even greater expense. If in an effort to avoid the
task of interviewing each member of the affected classes the court
were to substitute its own judgment as to the dollar bids and compensation demands, the ultimate objective of the Kaldor-Hicks
method will have been abandoned. That objective is to base social
choices upon subjectively-perceived dollar estimates of utility.
Hence, the method requires that those subjectively-perceived estimates be obtained from those whose estimates they are supposed
to be.
Aside from these problems of time and expense, there are difficulties inherent in the very suggestion of persons making the required dollar estimates. The purpose behind the suggestion that
affected individuals make dollar estimates of their subjectively-perceived gains and losses is to avoid the utilitarian's problem of measuring welfare. Instead of asking a person how many units of
utility or disutility he would incur under a particular social choice,
one asks a person how much he would be willing and able to pay
for the benefit or if he deems it a harm, how much he would insist
upon as compensation.
One of the problems with this proposal is that such estimates are
not likely to accurately measure subjective welfare if the persons
polled know that the judicial system uses the Kaldor-Hicks
method of evaluation and know that this method does not require
payment of actual compensation to the losers under a particular
alternative. If A thinks that a certain alternative would benefit
him and he knows that he will not have to pay actual compensation to those who oppose the alternative, he will be tempted to
make a larger Kaldor-Hicks bid than he would make if he knew
that he would actually have to pay the sum. Consequently, appliPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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cation of the Kaldor-Hicks method would result in an overstatement of the welfare value of judicial alternatives. In addition,
those who believe they would lose under a particular judicial alternative will also understand that no compensation will actually be
tendered and will therefore have no incentive to state their true
beliefs. Instead, they will have a strong incentive to state compensation demands at prohibitively high levels, with the consequence
that the method would result in an overstatement of the value of
burdens imposed by the alternatives.
A more fundamental difficulty with the proposal concerns the
intuitive reluctance many feel at even trying to translate certain
kinds of advantages or harm into monetary value. There is an
obscure, but strong, sense that the very effort to make such translations to the extent called for by a rigorous application of the
Kaldor-Hicks program would somehow change the fabric of one's
consciousness of the self and the world. In order to determine
whether there is any justification for this common reluctance we
must begin with the fact that we are being asked to place dollar
equivalents upon things we value. That is, we are being asked to
state the amounts of money we would be willing and able to pay
for things we regard as valuable. The question is whether the attempt to comply in any sustained and comprehensive manner will
tend to alter our experience of reality for the worse.
Because we are being asked to translate our perceived values
into monetary equivalents it is necessary to consider the phenomenon of money. Money is a means of exchange. The concept of a
means of exchange is logically related to the concept of trade
which, in turn, is logically related to a concept of a market. Thus,
one of the presuppositions of the Kaldor-Hicks request is that the
things we are being asked to translate into monetary equivalents
are things that conceivably could be acquired through a market
exchange. But some values cannot be acquired through trade;
they arise, if at all, through individual effort or interpersonal relationships that transcend the market. Insofar as one falls into the
habit of thinking of such values as attainable through trade, one
risks losing a genuine experience of those values themselves.
Consider an individual for whom the experience of reading and
reflecting upon Gerald Manley Hopkins' "The Windhover" or
"God's Grandeur" is deeply moving and significant. I submit that
such a person would tend to regard with distaste a Kaldor-Hicks
demand that he translate the value of this spiritual experience into
a dollar amount. One senses, perhaps unconsciously, that if one
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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were to try such a translation one would risk shattering the structure of the poetic experience itself. Some modes of experience cannot be acquired through exchange. To the extent that one seduces
oneself into believing that they can be so acquired one makes it
more difficult to fully savor the experience. The suggestion that
one ought to be able to translate all modes of experience into dollar figures is a step in the direction of such self-seduction. A similar point can be made with respect to other experiences, including
love, friendship, creative work, artistic expression, play, laughter,
awe, mystery, and worship.
It might be objected that these contentions are surely too extreme. Is it not commonplace that people have no spiritual difficulty in evaluating and paying dollar amounts for items such as
books, which, in turn, are necessary conditions for certain kinds of
experience? Why should it be any different for legal entitlements?
After all, entitlements are also necessary conditions for certain
modes of experience, and it is only the entitlements which the
Kaldor-Hicks method requires us to evaluate in monetary terms.
Nevertheless there is a significant difference in the relationship
between the respective conditions and the modes of experience
they make possible. It is true that obtaining a copy of Hopkins'
poetry is a necessary condition for experiencing that poetry in a
deep way and that one will have to be willing to exchange a sum
of money for a copy (putting aside for the moment such possibilities as listening to another read the poetry or obtaining a copy by
gift). Nonetheless, the condition of being protected by the legal
system against the intrusions of others with respect to engaging in
a particular mode of activity impresses one as more integral to that
mode of activity than does the condition of paying a sum of money
for a book. What I mean by "more integral" is that in the protection-from-intrusion case, one would be more tempted to let a dollar evaluation of the enabling condition carry over in one's
consciousness to the activity that the condition makes possible.
The enabling condition is not so easily detached from the mode of
experiencing as is the case with the price of a book and the experience of reading that book.
This, however, is only a difference of degree. Even in the case of
buying a book of poetry one has to guard against the tendency to
assimilate in one's own mind the cost of the book and the potentially profound experience of reading the poetry itself, an experience which cannot be acquired on the market.
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Another factor flowing from the implicit appeal to the metaphor
of the market is the sense that certain values should not have to be
purchased at all, but that one's fellow human beings ought to be
willing to protect them simply by virtue of their intrinsic humanity. Think of such values as life, bodily integrity, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion. The request that one translate
these kinds of fundamental values into dollar amounts tends to
make one think of them as obtainable only through voluntary
market transactions and thereby engenders a sense of alienation
from one's fellows. That is, continued appeal to the market metaphor tends to erase one's sense of human solidarity. It promotes an
atmosphere of competitive interpersonal confrontation in which
one perceives one's very life to be at stake. The implicit suggestion
is that unless one can bid enough for the value, no one else will be
willing to obtain it for him. Of course I am not suggesting that the
present state of society is in such a condition of disintegration. But
I am suggesting that appeal to the market metaphor with respect
to fundamental values tends to induce a psychological sense of
alienation from others which, in turn, can contribute to the weakening of human solidarity.
Two additional factors arise from the implicit assumption that
money is the ultimate standard into whose terms all values can be
translated. The suggestion seems to be, "If you can translate this
value into dollars and cents then perhaps I can begin to understand the value." One implication of this assumption is that the
ideal mode of existence is that of the consumer who masters the
human situation through the power of his purse. But if this ideal
is not well founded, as it surely is not, then the Kaldor-Hicks question is spiritually dangerous if taken too seriously. A second implication is the assumption that no value is personal enough or close
enough to the center of the human essence to avoid translation
into the universal medium of exchange. This comes close to experiencing oneself as a commodity.' 5 If all values can be reduced to
dollar amounts, then it is no great leap to conclude that one's very
self is also so reducible. One's very personhood becomes a commodity with a market price.
The foregoing point concerns perceived benefits. What about
perceived harms? Is there a similar incompatibility between certain modes of suffering and the request that one reduce such suffering into dollars? I think there is. Certain deep forms of suffering
15. For a general discussion, see E.
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threaten the very core of personhood. Think, for example, of the
kind of suffering involved in living without basic civil rights. To
suggest to a person that he should be able to correlate dollar
figures to any such suffering is to ask him to conceive of his personhood without the benefit of basic civil rights. The requested
dollar figures are, by definition, what he is supposed to regard as
"adequate compensation" for the suffering. But there are some
modes of suffering that a person should not be encouraged to think
of as being adequately compensable by money. To undergo such
suffering is to become less than a person. And for one to try imagining dollar amounts that would adequately compensate him for
such suffering is to risk alienating oneself from one's own sense of
personhood.
Another difficulty with the Kaldor-Hicks method of evaluation
arises from its dependence upon ability to pay. Recall that the
self-perceived gainers under a particular social choice are asked to
state the dollar amount they would be willing to pay for the benefit. But ability to pay ought not have any bearing upon certain
fundamental human rights. For example, with respect to rights
such as freedom of speech and religion, we are morally entitled to
legal protection simply by virtue of being persons. To make one's
entitlement to such protections depend upon ability to pay is to
treat a person as less than a being of intrinsic worth.
Consider a simple example in this regard. Imagine a society
comprised of two racial groups, one constituting the vast majority.
Suppose that the majority hates the minority, that the majority
owns the greater proportion of the society's wealth, that the minority is poor and politically powerless, and that the judicial choice is
between giving or denying religious liberty to the minority. Suppose, finally, that the Kaldor-Hicks dollar estimates comes out as
follows: (1) The majority's aggregate dollar bid for a rule denying
the minority religious freedom is fifty million dollars. (2) The minority's demand for compensation under a rule denying them religious freedom is ten million dollars. The minority feels
constrained by the fact that they have very little income and need
the money to survive. (3) The minority's aggregate bid for a rule
protecting their religious freedom is five million dollars; they cannot afford a greater sum. (4) The majority's demand for compensation under a rule giving the minority religious liberty is fifty
million dollars. This figure represents the psychic suffering the
majority believe they would incur as a result of witnessing the minority exercise their religious preferences. The first Kaldor-Hicks
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standard would require the court to deny the minority religious
freedom. The net welfare-dollar gain under such a rule would be
forty million dollars, while there would be a net welfare-dollar loss
under a rule protecting the minority. A criterion of social choice
which generates such a result is morally objectionable.
It might be suggested that such counterexamples can be avoided
by interpreting the Kaldor-Hicks standard as applicable only after
an equal distribution of social product had been made. But there
are at least two difficulties with this suggestion.
First, courts would have no way of knowing what the KaldorHicks dollar bids and demands would be under circumstances of
an equal distribution of wealth. It is true that each member of the
affected classes could be asked to make hypothetical bids and demands based upon the nonfactual assumption that he has some
specified level of income and wealth equal to everyone else's share.
But it is doubtful whether such hypothetical estimates would carry
much validity as accurate welfare measures.
A more basic problem arises from the fact that the Kaldor-Hicks
method is a strong value-specific efficiency standard based upon a
nonevaluative theory of the good. Thus, even if all Kaldor-Hicks
bids and demands were based upon an equal distribution of income the possibility would remain that persons would make bids
and demands in ways inconsistent with their own well-being.
Consider the earlier example involving the majority and minority
classes. Assume the same hatred of the majority for the minority
and the same legal issue. Even with an equal distribution of income it is possible for the Kaldor-Hicks auction to result in the
suppression of the minority's religious liberties. This occurs if the
majority's hatred was strong enough to invoke a large bid for a
rule denying religious liberty and if the minority, with an inadequate understanding of its own true well-being, submitted a demand for compensation that failed to do justice to the true
measure of human loss.
As argued earlier in the discussion of the Pareto standard, the
objection is not simply that the Kaldor-Hicks method can be used
to reach morally objectionable results. It is also, and perhaps more
importantly, that the method even requires one to take into account desires whose fulfillment will frustrate the common good.
Surely one of the proper functions of an adequate set of moral
principles is that of providing a means for disregarding certain
kinds of desires and objectives as morally irrelevant from the very
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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outset. Thus, with respect to the foregoing example, the KaldorHicks method requires one to count as equally relevant, for moral
purposes, the hatred of the majority for the minority and the minority's desire for religious freedom. The fulfillment of the first
desire will not bring about genuine well-being for the majority.
Hence, it is morally objectionable to use a standard of evaluation
that takes such desires into positive account.
With this background one can now quickly see that neither
Kaldor-Hicks standard is morally justifiable. The first standard
recommends that the judicial system make all moves that are
Kaldor-Hicks superior to an existing state of affairs. This recommendation is morally unsound if there are Kaldor-Hicks superior
alternatives that are morally objectionable. Examples such as the
majority-minority conflict show that this is the case. The second
standard advises against any social choice which is not KaldorHicks superior to an existing state of affairs. This norm is morally
unsound if there are alternatives which are morally superior, but
not Kaldor-Hicks superior, to the existing state of affairs. That
such is the case is easy to show. Consider a simple extension of the
majority-minority example. Suppose that the existing situation is
one in which the minority have no religious rights. Suppose further that the balance of economic power would result in a KaldorHicks auction reaffirming the present rule. It would be morally
preferable to change the legal system so as to give the minority
religious rights, but it would not be Kaldor-Hicks superior to the
present situation.
VII.

EVALUATIVE AND NONEVALUATIVE STANDARDS IN
ADJUDICATIVE CONTEXTS

All the efficiency standards reviewed in this paper share the assumption that it is unjustifiable for courts to try to assess the genuine common interest of those affected by judicial decisions. All
share the assumption that the appropriate standard of the common good is solely a function of the personal evaluations of those
affected by the adjudiciation rather than a function of the evaluations of the adjudicating courts. Let us begin by trying to understand the attractiveness of this assumption. I suggest that it is
explainable on the basis of certain difficulties which proponents of
nonevaluative methods believe they see in evaluative methods.
One possible explanation is that the reluctance to impose one's
own view of the common good upon others is a consequence of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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moral skepticism, the view that genuine knowledge of moral truth
is unattainable. A question raised by this explanation is whether
moral skepticism as so defined can adequately justify the non-evaluative method of adjudication.
An argument leading from the premise of moral skepticism to
the conclusion that an evaluative method is unjustifiable would
presumably look something like the following:
(1) Genuine knowledge of moral truth is unattainable;
(2) One is justified in coercing others only when one is in possession of genuine knowledge of moral truth;
(3) Adjudicating on the basis of an evaluative theory of the
good would constitute coercing others on the basis of
something less than genuine knowledge of moral truth;
(4) Hence, such adjudication is unjustifiable.
The conclusion favoring the nonevaluative method can be connected with the foregoing by the following:
(5) The only alternative basis for adjudication is a nonevaluative standard;
(6) Adjudication on the basis of a nonevaluative theory of the
good does not constitute coercing others.
Assume for the moment that premise (1) is true and look to see
whether the rest of the argument follows. One immediate problem
is that (2) is inconsistent with (1). One would have to believe oneself in possession of genuine moral knowledge in order to make this
claim sincerely. That is, (2) is itself a claim to moral knowledge
and hence contradicts premise (1). Further, premises (1) and (2)
prove too much for anyone who is not a pacifist. They imply that
coercion is never justifiable. For anyone committed to some form
of legal coercion such a position cannot be taken seriously.
A related difficulty is that applications of the Kaldor-Hicks standard will involve judicial coercion in any case. Given the fact that
there will generally be conflicts of preference, those who lose out
under particular applications of the standard will feel coerced. It
is true that coercion does not accompany applications of the
Pareto standard in the same way because that standard does not
apply to cases of preference conflict. As argued previously, the
Pareto standard is inadequate as a principle of adjudication and
would have to be supplemented by some principle that enables
courts to choose sides in cases of interest conflict, and such cases
would involve coercion. Additionally, a member of the social order who believes on philosophical grounds that the Pareto standard is an inadequate principle of social choice and who is forced
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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to live under judicial applications of the standard will feel coerced,
even when he happens to agree with some applications of the standard. Thus, premise (6) is mistaken.
Evaluation of premise (1) requires consideration of the concept
of moral knowledge. Moral knowledge is the knowledge of good
and evil. Intrinsic goods and evils are those things good or evil in
themselves. Instrumental goods and evils are those things which
serve as conditions for intrinsic goods and evils. The categories
overlap. The distinction between intrinsic good and evil arises
within human experience itself. That is, it is particular modes of
human experience that are intrinsically good or evil. Any particular mode of experience is intrinsically good to the extent that at
least one of its dimensions fulfills a desire of the subject. Similarly,
a mode of experience is intrinsically evil to the extent that at least
one of its dimensions frustrates a desire of the subject. Thus, the
distinction between intrinsic good and evil arises because we have
needs and desires and are able to distinguish fulfillment from frustration of desire.
An intrinsically good experience, or dimension of an experience,
is desirable in itself in the sense that, other things being equal, it is
rational to pursue it for its own sake and not merely because it
may be a means toward some further experience. Existing in the
presence of intrinsic good means existing in the awareness that at
least one aspect of present experience brings happiness and requires no justification beyond itself.
This is not to suggest that there are unmixed states of either
intrinsic good or intrinsic evil. This may be possible but it is not
the norm. Introspection shows that experience is a synthetic unity
of intrinsically good and evil dimensions. We simultaneously experience fulfillment and frustration. That this is so is to be expected, given the fact that many desires co-exist in any given
moment of consciousness, that some of them are mutually incompatible, and that others are necessarily incapable of complete satisfaction. Of course, some modes of experience have greater or lesser
degrees of intrinsic good or intrinsic evil than others and we make
such discriminations continually. I am only denying that there are
modes of experience containing either intrinsic good or evil to the
exclusion of the other. The simple fact that a given individual
persists in the effort to stay alive shows that at least some dimensions of his experience are intrinsically fulfilling.
Given an awareness of the distinction between fulfillment and
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
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suffering, one learns through experience that certain actions and
conditions tend to promote intrinsic good while others tend to frustrate it; the process of living in the world tends to instruct one in
the knowledge of instrumental good and evil. I do not mean to
suggest that such beliefs are always certain or well-founded. There
is a great deal we do not understand about the conditions of intrinsic good and evil. That we have some degree of understanding,
however, cannot be doubted. Similarly, I do not mean to suggest
that our knowledge of intrinsic good and evil is ever certain or
complete. There will never be absolute certainty as to the content
or precise boundaries of the intrinsically good human life. But this
inevitable lack of complete knowledge does not imply a lack of any
knowledge of intrinsic good and evil. Everyday experience confirms that we do have such knowledge.
Thus, one who can distinguish between states of his own happiness and suffering and understand at least some of the casual relationships between such states and other conditions has some
degree of self-knowledge. That is, he understands at least some of
the content of intrinsic and instrumental good and evil for his own
case. The question arises whether such knowledge can be extended to knowledge of good and evil for others and whether such
goods and evils have everything in common with one's own. I
think that such extensions are often made. One learns by experience that many of the things that constitute intrinsic goods and
evils for oneself are also intrinsic goods and evils for others. Indeed, such knowledge is an essential part of what it means to come
to experience oneself as one person among others. One comes to
perceive oneself as sharing certain fundamental needs and desires
with all others, thereby coming to understand at least some of the
dimensions of the human essence.
Knowledge of universal goods and evils is acquired in various
ways. Sometimes one is initiated into a particular kind of activity
or experience by another who already practices and loves it.
Sometimes one finds oneself doing the initiating. On other occasions one finds oneself coming together with others under circumstances in which everyone understands the nature of fulfillment
that participation can bring. In all such situations one both finds
a particular kind of activity intrinsically fulfilling and experiences
others as participating in the same good.
Therefore, I conclude that premise (1) is false. Genuine knowledge of moral truth is attainable. We live with such knowledge
everyday and are continually drawn by our very success in attainhttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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ing it to seek deeper illumination concerning intrinsic good and
evil and its conditions.
A second possible justification for the nonevaluative method of
adjudication can be construed by dropping premise (1) while retaining the rest of the argument. One would then have the
following:
(1) One is justified is coercing others only when one has genuine knowledge of moral truth;
(2) Adjudicating on the basis of an evaluative theory of the
good constitutes coercing others on the basis of something
less than genuine knowledge of moral truth;
(3) Hence, such adjudication is unjustifiable.
Again, the following steps would be needed to reach a conclusion
favoring a nonevaluative method:
(4) Adjudicating on the basis of a nonevaluative theory of the
good is the only alternative;
(5) Such adjudication does not involve coercion on the basis
of something less than genuine knowledge of moral truth.
One difficulty with this argument is that premise (1) sets an unreasonably high standard. It should be sufficient to have a justified belief in the sense that one believes certain propositions on the
basis of considerations which make them well-founded, given one's
conscientious understanding of the circumstances. (Of course,
what may be well-founded in one epistemological situation might
not be in another.) It is unreasonable to go further and insist that
the belief must be true. It would follow from such an assumption
that one should never coerce another when one has less than absolute moral certainty. Not even absolute certainty would be a sufficient condition for complete justifiability under the proposed
standard. In addition to being absolutely certain one would have
to be correct. But one must often act, under conditions of uncertainty, in ways that have coercive effects upon others. To argue
that one must not act without absolute certainty would require
foregoing action in many circumstances that call for a quick
decision.
Suppose for the sake of argument that the phrase, "genuine
knowledge of moral truth," as used in premises (1) and (2), is construed so as to require only justified moral belief. This would
avoid the above difficulty. The question then is whether the premises as interpreted are true. The answer depends upon what is
meant by "justified." I suggest that proponents of such an argument assume that a moral belief is justified only if a consensus of
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informed opinion with regard to the claim is achievable. It is because many doubt the possibility of such an informed consensus
with respect to evaluative judgments that they are led to subscribe
to premise (2).
Is it true that a moral belief is justified only if a consensus of
informed opinion with respect to the claim is achievable? The answer depends in part upon how one defines the terms "achievable"
and "consensus of informed participants." If one defines "achievable" to mean attainable under present historical conditions within
a relatively short period of time, and if one defines "consensus of
informed participants" to include the opinion of any intellectually
competent adult, then the claim is false. With respect to most coercive situations there will exist at least one intellectually competent person who, if informed of the circumstances, would question
whether coercion is morally justifiable. Yet we do not take this
ever-present possibility to imply that coercion is never morally justified. On the other hand, if one restricts the concept of informed
observer to include only those who believe that a given act of coercion is morally justified, one has achieved truth at the expense of
triviality. There is a sense in which a natural law theorist would be
committed to defending the proposition. Part of the natural law
understanding is that there exists a complex of fundamental needs
and desires common to all persons, fulfillment of which promotes
genuine integration. It is also part of this understanding that,
given perfect knowledge and moral integration on the part of all
members of the informed community, there would be achievable a
consensus concerning the justifiability of specific acts of coercion.
Of course, such conditions are not presently realizable. That there
exists an objective moral truth and that this truth is partially
knowable are guiding principles in a natural law search for moral
understanding.
Commitment to an objective order of moral truth in the foregoing sense does not commit the natural law theorist to the proposition that acts of political coercion should never be undertaken in
the absence of consensus. On the contrary, the natural law understanding is that moral knowledge is elusive and controversial, that
it arises out of a continuous dialectic of conflicting claims, and that
it is an essential part of seeking the truth to be prepared to move
ahead in the face of intellectual and political opposition. Indeed,
it would be a serious error to use the presence of social consensus as
a criterion for moral knowledge. The primary source of knowledge
of good and evil is one's own consciousness. Looking exclusively to
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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others for moral guidance with respect to the nature of the good is
a certain way to fail to achieve any moral guidance at all. If the
primary source of moral knowledge is one's own consciousness,
then we would only mislead one another in our respective quests
for moral understanding by each looking exclusively to the other.
No one would be tapping the primary source of understanding
and consequently all would be misled. Thus, premise (1) is false if
construed to mean that one is justified in coercing others only
when coercion will garner a consensus of informed observers.
Let us move to a consideration of premise (2). What is the justification for believing that adjudication on the basis of an evaluative theory of the good necessarily implies proceeding on the basis
of something less than genuine moral knowledge?
I suggest that at least part of the consideration typically thought
to support premise (2) is the belief that there is no common human
essence and hence no common good. Moral knowledge is attainable by each person for his own case in the sense that each can learn
the content of intrinsic good and evil for himself. Efforts to generalize from one's own experiences of fulfillment will fail. One can
make no useful generalizations about the nature of human fulfillment and frustration. One person finds happiness through hatred
and cruelty; a second through narrow self-interest and indifference
to the needs of others; a third through other-regarding love. Because there are no moral universals and because introspection is a
more reliable method for identifying the nature of the good for a
particular individual than is external observation, adjudication
should rely solely upon each concerned individual to report the
nature of the good for his own case. A nonevaluative standard
satisfies this condition; an evaluative standard does not. An evaluative standard involves precisely the attempt to generalize from
one's own experiences of fulfillment and frustration to the situations of others.
The absence of common elements binding together human experience of good and evil entails an inevitable absence of consensus concerning any particular application of an evaluative
standard of the good. Presumably, the nonevaluative standards
under consideration in this paper do not share this weakness for we
all know how to count noses and dollars, and that seems to be the
only prerequisite for applying the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
standards.
I have already outlined criticisms of the claim that there is no
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common human essence and of the belief that the only justifiable
moral standard of good is one that can be applied by consensus.
For these reasons alone premise (2) must be rejected. An even
deeper motivation behind the fascination with nonevaluative standards of the good is their implicit promise of being applicable
through quantitative methods. Once we have identified the relevant classes all we need do to apply the Pareto standard is count
the responses. All we need do to apply the Kaldor-Hicks standard
is count positive and negative dollar amounts. The underlying
idea is that evaluative standards of the good require qualitative
judgments and that such judgments necessarily involve controversy. Only quantitative standards can supply intersubjective
agreement. We know how to count persons and dollars and we all
count them in the same way. Thus, such reflection simultaneously
inclines one to 'eject (2) and accept (5).
The notion that a belief that cannot be reduced to quantitative
form fails to qualify as genuine knowledge runs deep in post-Enlightenment culture. It is the historical result of at least two factors. First, we tend to be overly impressed and misled by modern
physics' application of mathematical methods. 16 We fail to see
that even within the boundaries of the problems explicitly studied
by physics, quantitative methods raise deep philosophical issues
that ultimately can be formulated and discussed only in qualitative terms. Moreover, we tend to forget that physics does not even
purport to deal with the philosophical problem of how to live, the
question which the law must confront.
A second factor is our disillusionment with traditional forms of
philosophical discourse that rely upon qualitative judgments. We
are weary of the interminable controversy seemingly inherent in
the traditional mode of philosophizing. We long for the apparent
clarity and intersubjective agreement of quantitative methods.
We are tired of bearing up under the sense of moral responsibility
that comes with the realization that qualitative judgments are potentially isolating. My qualitative judgments might be different
from yours and I must then choose at my peril. What we would
like is a mechanically applicable method to which all could subscribe in good conscience and in whose applications all could
agree. Such a method would lift the burden of responsibility.
16. For an illuminating discussion of the general influence of the scientific model
upon the field of law and economics, see Horwitz, Law and Economics.- Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980).
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From thenceforth we could say to whoever complained about the
direction of social policy, "It is not my doing at all. The coercive
effects you dislike are the inevitable outcome of a system of knowledge that generates quantitative results about which there can be
no rational disagreement."
Philosophical and moral knowledge, however, cannot be attained through quantitative methods. An ability to make qualitative judgments is a necessary condition for counting anything. To
count is to correlate instances of a concept with numbers. For example, counting the number of persons in a building means counting the number of instances of the concept 'X is a person in this
building.' Similarly, measuring the weight in ounces of a given
object means counting the instances of the concept 'X consists of
one ounce of this object.' It follows that counting requires the recognition of certain phenomena as instances of whatever it is one is
trying to count or measure. Hence, quantitative judgments necessarily presuppose qualitative judgments. In addition, the very
choice of a method and scale for measuring a given quantity necessarily involves qualitative judgment. There is no way of counting
one's way to seeing that a given method is an appropriate one for
measuring a given property.
In nonmoral contexts such as measuring the weight or length of
physical objects, neither type of dependence presents any special
difficulty. In such cases there is general agreement both as to recognizing instances and as to appropriate methods and scales of
measurements. The situation is different in moral contexts. First,
the problem of recognizing a given phenomenon as an instance of
any countable unit involves hopeless controversy over how to
measure welfare directly. It is true that we can avoid this problem
by substituting language of numbers of persons or dollars for language about the good. These are the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
alternatives. But, as we have seen, these alternatives merely postpone the inevitable qualitative judgment that such units of measurement are adequate for capturing the moral realities of good
and evil. This qualitative transition is inherently controversial
and we cannot count our way out of the controversy at this level. It
is in this sense that moral knowledge is ultimately beyond the
reach of quantitative methods. Thus, I conclude that premises (2)
and (5) must be rejected.
Our preoccupation with the market system as a way of organizing human conduct provides yet another explanation for the attractiveness of nonevaluative methods. We are attracted to
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theories which extend the economist's understanding of human interaction in market settings to other dimensions of life. The
Kaldor-Hicks standard relies upon the picture of a hypothetical
market. Persons are conceived as translating their desires and
aversions into monetary terms and then entering into mutually
satisfactory trades with others who have made similar translations.
And even though the Pareto standard does not rely upon the notion of a market in which mutual exchanges in the Kaldor-Hicks
sense occur, it does rely on the idea of persons coming together and
entering into a comprehensive contract that each sees will either
increase, or at worst, not affect, his welfare. That is, the Pareto
standard relies on the idea of persons mutually agreeing to exchange their rights to make objections to future applications of a
given practice for the security of living under a rule which appears
beneficial. But if it should turn out, as I think it does, that the
deepest dimensions of good and evil cannot be reached with such a
theory, then we err in using the concept of a market transaction as
paradigmatic for moral reflection. If there are desires that transcend the kinds of narrowly self-interested desires providing the
impetus for market exchanges, and if moral justification ultimately
requires something beyond the mere promise of mutually beneficial trades between atomistic members of a class of rationally prudential egoists, then reliance upon the market metaphor can only
mislead us.
These last suggestions can be made more concrete by considering the justifiability of an adjudicative method that relies upon an
evaluative standard of the good. I shall consider the question of
justification both from the viewpoint of the adjudicator and from
that of the person whose interests are adjudicated.
Let us first briefly consider the nature of a moral justification for
an action or practice. A moral justification is a practical argument
in the sense defined by the natural law tradition. A practical argument purporting to justify a particular act, X, is a set of premises
which purport to show that X is a reasonable means of fulfilling
some desire or purpose, which, in turn, is either an essential component of an intrinsically fulfilling mode of existence or a useful
means toward such.
The moral question for the adjudicator is, "How can I justify
adjudicating cases on the basis of my own theory of the common
good when such action forces me to contradict at least one other
person's sense of value and consequently coerces him?" The general justification I propose is that the adjudicator, by virtue of his
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human essence, has a fundamental desire to contribute to the common good and that this objective requires making choices on the
basis of his own sense of good and evil.
The desire to realize through action one's fundamental powers is
part of the human essence. One of these fundamental powers is
the power to contribute to the integrated realization of the essential powers of others, which is to say, contribute to their fulfillment. This desire, in turn, is part of a more inclusive desire to
contribute to the realization of essential potentiality. Living creatures are defined by their potentialities. They find whatever degree of fulfillment they are able to attain by realizing these
potentialities. Those who assist in that kind of realization fulfill
themselves in the very act of so contributing. This basic desire to
contribute to the perfection of life is exemplified in persons finding
satisfaction through tending plants, caring for animals, raising
children, and interacting with close friends. In all such cases the
satisfaction consists in the very activity of contribution to the unfolding of the essential capacities of other forms of life.
This fundamental desire to assist in the realization of the essential powers of others is innate, manifesting itself even in small children. It does not depend upon the attainment of any particular
intellectual understanding of the nature of reality. The desire,
however, can be strengthened and integrated by metaphysical reflection upon the mode of identity binding all beings together.
This identity is evident from the fact that every finite being ontologically depends upon a source which itself is ungrounded. One's
participation in this source is indirectly a participation in all the
finite processes through which that source grounds.
A necessary consequence of using one's freedom is making
choices that affect the well-being of others. The choices made inevitably affect the range of alternatives open to others, both by
making some more difficult to attain than they would otherwise be
and by making others more attainable. To the extent that one's
action makes at least one alternative for another more difficult,
that action has coercive implications. Of course, there is a tremendous range of variation with respect to types and degrees of coercion in this sense and I do not mean to suggest that they should all
be evaluated alike. What I do suggest is that all action in social
contexts has coercive implications for the choices available to
others and that it is best to realize this at the outset of any philosophic effort to ascertain the nature of true morality.
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Given one's fundamental desire to contribute to the realization
of the essential powers of others one would have no good reason for
even trying to extricate one's own sense of good and evil from
those choices which causally affect the well-being of others. In order to contribute to the well-being of another one must rely upon
one's own sense of good and evil for guidance concerning what
true fulfillment for the other involves. Of course, an essential
predicate for making such an attempt is putting oneself imaginatively in the place of the other in order to apprehend as directly as
possible the other's perception, feelings, and desires. But this kind
of imaginative understanding does not require an abandonment of
one's own understanding of the good. The objective pursued is the
ascertainment of good and evil for the other in his situation. This
cannot be done without first truly understanding the other's situation by imaginative identification with his perceptions and feelings. In addition, one must go on to apply one's own sense of good
and evil to the other's situation as it is sympathetically perceived.
Thus, the process of contributing to the unfolding of another's essential powers consists of at least two steps: first, imaginatively
participating in the other's life situation and, second, trying to
bring about what is genuinely good for the other in that situation.
The second step cannot be effectively undertaken apart from relying upon one's own understanding of the good. To rely solely
upon the other's vision of the good would be to abandon the enterprise altogether.
This kind of imaginative effort is a commonplace activity. A
loving parent who makes choices that affect the well-being of his
child will strive to both intuit the child's feelings and to identify
the good for the child on the basis of the parent's own sense of
good and evil. Neither effort would be helpful alone.
Of course, one will sometimes choose to go along with another's
perception of good and evil despite one's contrary perception and
despite one's belief that the latter's choices will ultimately cause
suffering. But even in these cases one is guided by the conviction
that freedom to make mistakes is often an essential condition for
self-development. Thus, even here one is relying upon one's own
sense of good and evil. In other cases one will feel drawn to act on
the basis of one's own understanding of the good even though such
action may carry coercive implications for the other.
An adjudicator occupies a unique political role. He is assigned
the task of formulating and applying coercive social rules. This
activity is justified by the fact that a society must have rules of
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conduct. If there are to be rules someone must be charged with
the responsibility for formulating and applying them. The activity
of formulating and applying social rules necessarily has coercive
implications for those who will be affected in some way by the
adjudicator's decisions. Hence, the question is not whether to adjudicate in such a way as to avoid coercing others; there is no alternative. The question is whether to adjudicate on the basis of an
evaluative or a non-evaluative theory of the good.
The argument for adjudicating on the basis of an evaluative
standard is grounded upon the adjudicator's natural desire to contribute to the common good through the political role he has assumed. As argued above, everyone must make choices which carry
coercive implications for others. One who seeks to contribute to
the genuine fulfillment of others will necessarily strive both to sympathetically identify with the life situations of others and to act on
the basis of one's own sense of good and evil. In this regard an
adjudicator is no different. Indeed, if there is good reason for a
nonadjudicator to proceed on the basis of his own theory of the
good there is even more reason for an adjudicator to do so. Society
has entrusted the adjudicator with the responsibility for systematically promoting the common good in a way that is different from
the ways in which most other members of society do those things.
The fundamental purpose of a legal order is the promotion of the
common good. An adjudicator's special responsibility is the promotion of the common good through the formulation and application of coercive rules. The rational adjudicator will reason that,
given this objective and given his natural desire to serve that objective, he must proceed on the basis of his own sense of the common good. How else could he feel justified in believing that his
professional activities actually promote the common good? By using a nonevaluative theory of the good an adjudicator would deprive himself of the opportunity to contribute to the promotion of
the ultimate purpose of the legal order.
What about the problem of justifying adjudication on the basis
of an evaluative theory of the good from the standpoint of those
who will be subjected to the adjudicator's decisions? One form of
practical argument providing such a justification begins with the
premise that the ultimate purpose of a legal order ought to be the
promotion of the common good. For obvious reasons it is best to
order a complex society by means of a division of labor. One aspect of such a division is the creation of a social role for formulating and applying legal rules. The question is whether those who
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have to live under the decisions of those selected as adjudicators
should rationally prefer evaluative to nonevaluative adjudication.
I submit that they should prefer the evaluative mode. A rational
individual should reason that he desires the genuine common good
for all persons; that the ideal content of the common good and the
most efficient ways of promoting it are complex matters requiring
time, intelligence, and wisdom; that therefore the activity of systematically defining and pursuing the common good through the
administration of the legal order ought to be done by those with
the requisite time, intelligence, and wisdom; that the ultimate
touchstone for knowledge of intrinsic good and evil is the inner
consciousness of the individual himself; and that administering the
legal order through the moral perceptions of educated and wise
persons is a more likely means of securing the common good than
any alternative.
A significant feature of this justification is the assumption that
those subjected to the adjudicative power of the courts both desire
the common good and believe that others (in particular, the adjudicators) do so as well. Similarly, the justification from the viewpoint of the adjudicator relies upon the assumption that both the
adjudicator and those subject to his decisions desire the common
good. Both arguments depend upon the belief that persons can
and do have genuine desires for the well-being of others. Both rely
upon a fundamental sense of trust in the other. Such arguments
contrast with arguments that assume persons are incapable of genuinely desiring the fulfillment of others. Actions which contribute
to the well-being of others are explained on the basis of narrowly
self-interested concerns. The Hobbesian conception of human nature illustrates the pattern. In such a picture of human relationships there are only three basic modes of relating to another:
submission to the other's coercive power, exercising coercive power
over the other, and arms-length cooperation based upon cool selfinterested calculation. The conflict between these two kinds of
moral argument is one of the deepest in political philosophy. I
cannot here even begin working through the considerations involved. Suffice it to say that the Hobbesian picture is defective on
at least two grounds. It fails to adequately explain the degree of
cooperation and other-benefiting activity that actually exists and
it fails to correspond with our intuitions of our own motivations
and those of others.
Should courts using evaluative methods rely at all upon the
methods of economists, and, if so, how should they use them? Adhttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2
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judication calls for the application of knowledge, intelligence, and
wisdom to the concern of promoting the common good through
the creation and application of coercive social rules. The task involves both a vision of the common good and a sustained effort to
determine, in particular circumstances, the best means of working
toward that ultimate end. In resolving a particular issue the adjudicator will begin by distinguishing alternative solutions. He will
try to estimate the likely causal consequences for society that
would result from each alternative. He will evaluate these various
sets of consequences in terms of their moral significance, both for
good and for evil. Finally, he will try to select that solution whose
probable causal consequences will best promote his vision of the
common good in that context. It is at the second stage of his task,
viz., that of predicting the likely causal consequences of each alternative, that the adjudicator will often find economic theories useful. Insofar as such theories have predictive force, the adjudicator
will find them of value when it comes to estimating future consequences of judicial decisions. The adjudicator using an evaluative
standard of the common good, however, will not be willing to
yield to the economist, or anyone, the determination of the moral
significance of the various sets of consequences.
This point can be seen more clearly by considering in more detail the nature of the task of evaluating the moral significance of
causal consequences. Essential to such an evaluation is the determination of the benefits and costs that would result from the adoption of each available alternative. Consider the concept of a cost
(or burden). It is a truism that the cost of any particular choice is
the next best choice that could have been made. It is obvious that
one cannot determine what the "next best choice" would have
been without relying upon a substantive theory of the good. People who differ with respect to their conceptions of intrinsic good
will differ over the identification and evaluation of the costs of particular choices. Contrast, for example, the way in which a wealthy
hedonist would evaluate the costs of a system of progressive taxation with the way in which a democratic socialist would evaluate
those costs. The adjudicator will naturally be interested in learning how others evaluate the moral significance of the likely causal
consequences of alternative choices confronting him as a judge,
but he will reserve for himself the final decision as to their moral
significance. That is his unique responsibility and privilege. Relying upon a nonevaluative theory of the good would mean rejecting
this responsibility and privilege.
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The primary purpose of setting apart the role of adjudicator is
to obtain the benefits that can flow from the disciplined application of specialized knowledge and wisdom to the promotion of the
common good through the creation and application of a system of
legal rules. Permitting adjudicators to use nonevaluative standards of the good would frustrate that purpose.
What does an evaluative method of adjudication entail with respect to the question of quantifying burdens and benefits? That is,
what about the possibility of reaching decisions concerning the
common good in particular contexts by the use of solely quantitative methods? Such methods can be used in certain circumstances,
but only upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. The adjudicator must first identify possible burdens and benefits in terms of his
own ultimate standard of the common good. If some of these burdens and benefits are adequately measurable in quantitative terms
they can be handled quantitatively. But the use of quantitative
methods is limited by the prior application of the adjudicator's
own standard of the good. It is that standard which dictates when
quantitative methods are appropriate for measuring costs and benefits. There is no way of making the logically prior moral decision
as to the very identification of burdens and benefits by quantitative methods alone.
Furthermore, this logically prior task of identifying burdens and
benefits in light of an all-inclusive standard of the common good is
not reducible to any mechanical decision procedure. This dimension of the adjudicative activity necessarily involves bringing to
bear the adjudicator's conception of the good upon the concrete
situation. Such instantiation of the good cannot be mechanized
because it must be done teleologically. That is, the decisionmaker
must ask himself, "What is the nature of the common good and
how may that good be best realized in this situation?" This question cannot be adequately answered by the mechanical application of a rule. What is required is rather an act of intuitive
perception in which one responds to the situation and one's ideal
with all one's intellectual, emotional, and spiritual powers. This
cannot be mechanized.
It is instructive to observe the extent to which the adjudicative
practices of the courts are in accord with the foregoing analysis
and recommendations. That is, courts have generally adjudicated
on the basis of evaluative standards of the common good and have
weighed benefits and burdens in the light of such standards. The
common-law theory of private nuisance is a good illustration. The
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general proposition is that the courts adjudicate between conflicting patterns of land use on the basis of an evaluative theory of the
common good. They must consider both the contribution to the
common good of the defendant's activity and the contribution of
the plaintiff's pattern of use.1 7 The "utility of the defendant's conduct must be weighed against the gravity of the plaintiff's
harm." 1 8 Determining the social value of any given pattern of
land use must be made from an "objective point of view" as opposed to that of any particular individual, and the resolution of
the conflicting patterns of use must be made in light of the true
interests of the community as a whole.1 9
Thus, the very ascertainment and weighing of the costs and
benefits flowing from alternative resolutions of a land-use conflict
are made in light of the decisionmaker's evaluative standard of the
common good. To take an extreme example for purposes of making the point, consider the situation of a land owner who maintains a certain structure or engages in a certain activity primarily
for the purpose of annoying his neighbor. The neighbor sues for
injunctive relief. When it comes to the matter of determining the
extent of social value flowing from the defendant's conduct the
decisionmaker must choose between applying his own theory of
value or that of the defendant. That is, he must choose between
an evaluative and a nonevaluative standard of the common good.
The defendant may well value his activity very highly. It may be
one of the defendant's overriding passions in life to cause his neighbor suffering. In fact, the defendant may even be an individual of
great wealth and in a Kaldor-Hicks auction might be willing to
bid a very large sum of money for the benefit (in his eyes) of having a court resolve the case in his favor. On the other hand, the
adjudicator may not believe the defendant's desire to hurt his
neighbor has any positive social value; he may well deem it to be
of negative social value. Hence, the final determination as to the
net social utility of the defendant's conduct will depend directly
upon the adjudicator's standard of the common good and upon
20
whether that standard is evaluative or nonevaluative
A similar point can be made with respect to the evaluation of a
17. See 5 R.

POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

705 (1981).

18. Id.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 comments c, d, e (1979); id. § 827
comments b, e, f, g; id. § 828 comments e, f; id. § 829 comments c, d; id. § 821F comment
d.
20. See id. § 829 comment c.
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plaintiff's alleged harm. Consider the case of the so-called "hypersensitive" plaintiff. Imagine, for example, a land owner who has
an abnormal fear of a ringing church bell. The adjudicator, in
evaluating the context of the harm to the plaintiff, will not automatically accept the evaluation of the plaintiff. He will rather try
to determine the extent of the harm in terms of the "normal" individual. 2 ' Thus, the ascertainment and measurement of a cost is a
function of the decisionmaker's standard of the good and what
that standard entails with respect to the purposes to be served in a
judicial resolution of the dispute. The abnormally sensitive plaintiff is dominated by an overriding purpose, viz., to avoid hearing
the peal of church bells. In light of that objective, being forced to
live in the vicinity of a church bell imposes a very substantial cost.
Such an individual who happens to command great wealth would
probably be willing to demand a large amount as compensation in
a Kaldor-Hicks auction. But in light of the adjudicator's objective
of tailoring land-use rules for "reasonable" persons, the burden of
listening to the occasional peal of a church bell is not nearly so
onerous. Implicit in this concept of the "normal" individual is the
assumption that the rules formulated by courts ought to encourage
the development of at least the minimal conditions for a certain
kind of character structure. This is clearly the product of an evaluative standard of the common good.
One conclusion to be drawn from such observations of the law is
that the mere fact that courts consciously engage in a process of
balancing burdens against benefits does not necessarily mean that
they are thereby using the Kaldor-Hicks method. Any method of
moral or legal evaluation which takes into account the probable
consequences of choices will use "balancing" language. The reason for this tendency is that courts reason teleologically and therefore necessarily must consider the possible effects of alternative
choices upon various objectives and "balance" the attainment of
some against the preclusion of others.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

I have argued in this paper that the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency standards go far beyond the ideological purity of firstorder efficiency standards. They are strong value-specific efficiency standards that embody theories of intrinsic good. In short,
21. See id. § 821F comment d.
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they are standards grounded upon philosophical premises and
therefore ought to be evaluated as philosophies of the common
good rather than as innocent value-neutral norms of science or
common sense. I have argued that as theories of the good both
standards are inadequate for the task of evaluating the content of
a legal system. If used at all, they ought properly to be grounded
upon more comprehensive and more adequate principles which
define the limits within which they can operate with reasonable
results. My own conviction is that these more comprehensive principles ought to be defined on the basis of the natural law approach
to morality.
I have also argued that courts are justified in adjudicating on
the basis of evaluative, as opposed to nonevaluative, standards of
the good. Indeed, not only are courts justified in so doing, they are
morally obligated to do so if they are to adequately fulfill their
political role of promoting the common good. To the extent that
we are hesitant to acknowledge that courts are justified in using
evaluative standards we reveal an inadequate understanding of
the scope and limits of political authority.
I have discussed the thesis that the legal system can be administered with quantitative or mechanical methods. In that regard I
have tried to point to some of the epistemological difficulties inherent in a rigorous application of the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks standards and have attempted some generalizations about the illusory
nature of a solely quantitative method in moral and legal analysis.
Ultimately I have claimed that the only justifiable "method" of
adjudication is one in which a skilled and wise judge carefully examines the facts, distinguishes the major alternative ways of resolving the issue, tries to foresee the likely social consequences of each
alternative resolution, and resolves the case in the way best suited
to promote the common good. This, of course, is not a decision
procedure. Perhaps what we need most of all is an account of adjudication which leaves us with a good conscience about the inevitable use by courts of their own theories of the common good.
At crucial points I have relied upon the idea that the best justification for judicial reliance upon evaluative standards of the common good consists of an appeal to the desire on the part of judges
-to contribute disinterestedly to the common good. It may seem
paradoxical that I rely upon the possibility of human goodness in
the very attempt to justify a certain method of administering coercive rules. Does not the very existence of legal coercion prove illusory the belief that persons can ever be expected to transcend the
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limitations of their own narrowly conceived self-interest? The assumption of legal coercion is that individuals must be furnished
with external motivations to induce them to comply with practices
aimed at promoting the common good, that without the threat of
coercion people would not have the common good close enough to
their hearts to cooperate. It is true that the presence of legal coercion implies a collective belief in the reality of human evil and
narrow pursuit of self-interest. But it is also clear that a coercive
legal system such as ours could not, in fact, be administered well or
fairly without being applied by judges who are able to get beyond
their own self-interest, narrowly defined, and work for the common good. Thus, the fact of human evil and thoughtlessness
makes necessary coercive collective practices which, in turn, can
function adequately only if some persons, at least some of the time,
can work disinterestedly and intelligently for the common good.
That this coexistence of good and evil should strike us as a paradox
is only the product of a tendency to philosophize in extremes. We
are inclined to think that either human beings are wholly evil and
narrowly self-interested or completely good and unconcerned with
their own pursuits as narrowly conceived. It is true that although
we do not demand or expect that judges will be gods in human
form, we do expect that they will make a greater and more sustained effort to contribute to the common good than those in
wholly private roles. For those who doubt the capacity of human
beings to measure up to such demands I can only suggest that they
carefully observe the activities of the courts for a substantial period
of time.
Finally, it might be thought that my stress on evaluative standards implies that I leave no room for human freedom. That is, it
might be felt that the natural law conception of a legal system's
proper task as furnishing necessary or useful conditions for the
common self-realization of its citizens overemphasizes the role of
"conditions" at the expense of the individual's own movements toward self-realization on the basis of his own freedom. But this
would be a misunderstanding. In a social context self-realization
depends upon two kinds of conditions: first, what might be called
"enabling" conditions for individual fulfillment supplied by the
social structure in which the individual is embedded and, second,
the individual's own efforts. Both kinds of conditions are necessary
for self-realization. A political theory which ignores the role of enabling conditions tends to be naively individualistic, with little appreciation of the vital part played by the social context in any
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individual's life. On the other hand, a theory which ignores the
essential part played by the individual who must take the leap
from whatever enabling conditions are offered toward self-realization tends to be naively collectivist in approach, with insufficient
appreciation of the fact that in the final analysis no one can reach
into another's consciousness and force the latter into realization of
the human essence. Furthermore, I do not mean to suggest that
the legal system ought to try providing all conceivable enabling
conditions for individual self-realization. On the contrary, I believe that the legal system's proper role is to furnish only a relatively small subset of the total set of enabling conditions that are
necessary or useful for the free development of individual human
powers. The remainder ought to be supplied on the basis of voluntary individual and collective effort. Indeed, one way to understand the subject matter of moral obligation to others is to see such
obligations as defining ways in which one can and ought to contribute to the formation and sustaining of enabling conditions for
the free self-realization of others. I cannot here work through the
problem of drawing the line between those enabling conditions
properly supplied by the legal system and those which are better
furnished voluntarily, but suffice it to say that I believe a line can
be drawn in a principled way on the basis of a natural law theory
of the common good.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984

65

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 2

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss3/2

66

